A History of the Roman World by H. H. Scullard Read Free Book Online Page A

Detachments swept up the two valleys onto the terrace and fell on the Carthaginians’ flank before they had formed up. Seeing the day was lost Hasdrubal executed a masterly withdrawal and retired with half or two-thirds of his army. Crossing central Spain and the upper Ebro, he ultimately slipped through the western passes of the Pyrenees on his way to Italy.
    Though thwarted strategically, Scipio had won a glorious tactical victory, which was a real turning point in the development of the Roman army. The Romans were learning the lesson of Cannae and being trained to greater flexibility and individual initiative. Tactically the weak point at Baecula was that Scipio’s light troops were not holding the enemy’s main body during the outflanking movement. But that was soon to be remedied. Scipio has often been condemned by ancient and modern critics for allowing Hasdrubal to leave Spain. In the circumstances the charge is unjustified for three reasons. To follow Hasdrubal was too dangerous, if not impossible; and he could not hold all the passes of the Pyrenees. Secondly, Scipio’s object in Spain was to subdue it, not to expose it to the other two Carthaginian armies while hewent on a wild goose chase after Hasdrubal; indeed, it is doubtful whether as a mere privatus cum imperio he had the right to leave Spain without orders. Thirdly, the seriousness of Hasdrubal’s arrival in northern Italy in 207 has been over-emphasized; Rome could and did cope with the danger. Scipio solved a difficult situation with marked success. 2
    After Hasdrubal Barca’s departure for Italy, reinforcements were sent to Spain under Hanno, who joined Mago to recruit further in Celtiberia. They were checked by Silanus who captured Hanno, though Mago escaped and joined Hasdrubal Gisgo near Gades (207). With the threat to his flank now removed, Scipio could advance southwards, but Hasdrubal refused battle. His only hope was delay; so he turned to a Fabian strategy of exhaustion and distributed his army in various towns. Scipio did not waste time with a war of sieges, although as a demonstration his brother Lucius carried by assault a rich and valuable town, Orongis. In 206 the situation was changed. When Hasdrubal Gisgo heard that Hasdrubal Barca had been defeated and killed at Metaurus while seeking to join Hannibal, delay was useless; the fate of Spain must be staked on a pitched battle. Early in the year Scipio met the combined Carthaginian forces near Ilipa (Alcala del Rio, near Seville). For several days both armies faced each other in battle array with their best troops in the centre, their allies on the wings. Early one day Scipio drew up his troops in a different order with the Romans on the wings and a centre of Spaniards. A cavalry attack forced Hasdrubal to lead out his men in their usual formation, before he realized the altered Roman order. It was then too late to change. After a deliberate delay to weary the enemy, who had not breakfasted, Scipio stopped skirmishing and delivered the final blow. His centre advanced slowly, declining battle. Meanwhile his wings, by a complicated manoeuvre, were extended, advanced in column and then wheeled again into line, so that they outflanked the enemy, whose resistance soon crumpled. By a brilliantly rapid pursuit Scipio cut off the enemy’s retreat; though Hasdrubal and Mago escaped, their forces were cut to pieces or else surrendered. No less brilliant were Scipio’s tactics. He had rectified one of the weaknesses of Baecula; he now held the enemy’s main forces while the wings carried out their outflanking movement. 3
    The rest of the year was spent in diplomatic arrangements and punitive expeditions. To prepare for the future, Scipio slipped across to Africa to interview Syphax, the Numidian sheikh who had been troubling Carthage. On his return he made an example of some Spanish towns, Ilurgia (Illorci), Castax and Astapa (Estepa near Osuna), capturing the first by a brilliant converging