Army of Evil: A History of the SS by Adrian Weale Read Free Book Online Page B

as his nominee for Chief of Staff against considerable opposition, especially from the Stennes faction. Röhm was, in his own way, as radical in his views about the future role of the SA as anybody within the organisation. Nevertheless, he was a strict disciplinarian who could be counted on to recognise how high the stakes now were for the National Socialist movement. High on the momentum of the party’s recent electoral success and in the expectation that the NSDAP would soon assume power, the organisation’s existing leadership (Röhm did not take up his new role until January 1931) began to prepare themselves for their future after the seizure of power. In principle, the SA was to “turn away from propaganda, guard duty and the solicitation of funds” 16 and start to organise itself into the NSDAP’s national military force. In turn, the SS would take over most of the SA’s former tasks as the movement’s political foot soldiers. On1 December, Himmler—somewhat prematurely, as it turned out—announced the formal separation of the SS from the SA. 17
    If anything, the NSDAP’s success in the election heightened the tension between the party and the Stennes faction within the SA. With power almost within his grasp, Hitler knew he needed to tread carefully in order to avoid provoking the somewhat rattled establishment into a decisive strike against the whole National Socialist movement. But this softly-softly approach frustrated many members of the SA, who clung to their romantic, albeit brutal, notions of seizing power by force. The election campaign had witnessed an upsurge of political violence between right and left, and this had continued largely unabated afterwards, partly because the Communists had also significantly increased their support. This had led Röhm, in his first month as Chief of Staff, to ban SA participation in street battles. Meanwhile, Daluege’s Berlin SS continued to keep a wary eye on the Stennes clique, after all attempts to buy off and intimidate its leader had failed. For instance, when Stennes was offered the Interior Ministry of the state government of Brunswick—which had come under NSDAP control in the elections—he not only turned it down but openly criticised the corrupt and cynical party leadership in Munich.
    All of this tension finally came to a head on 28 March 1931, when President Hindenburg gave Chancellor Heinrich Brüning’s government the power to act against political excesses. The NSDAP leadership viewed this as a possible prelude to a ban on the party—or at least the SA—so Hitler ordered strict compliance with the rule of law. Stennes, seeing this as an attempt to curb his freedom of action, refused. Then, at a meeting in Weimar on 31 March, Hitler announced that Stennes was to leave his role as SA-Senior Leader East and would become Röhm’s executive officer in Munich. This transfer could have been seen as a sideways move rather than a demotion, but there is no doubt that Hitler—warned of Stennes’ continued plotting by Daluege—fully intended to provoke a strong reaction. He did not have to wait long. The very next day, the SS guards at Berlin’s party officeswere again beaten up by a mob of Stennes’ SA supporters, who then occupied the headquarters as well as the offices of Goebbels’ newspaper,
Der Angriff
(
The Attack
). Stennes then announced Hitler’s “dismissal” as party leader, and SA leaders throughout northern and eastern Germany publicly declared their support for their man.
    Berlin Regional Leader Goebbels had been trying to steer a middle course between Stennes and the Munich party leadership for many months, but now he clearly had to choose one side or the other. He had considerable personal sympathy for Stennes’ political views, but after being given plenipotentiary powers by Hitler to resolve the crisis, he came out firmly in support of the leadership. The Berlin Police again cleared the SA men from party headquarters. Then, in