law what had long been common practice; that is, a person would be returned to the United States only if it was clear that he or she had committed a crime for which an arrest could be made in Canada. Stealing oneself was clearly not a Canadian crime, so the law promised that no escaped slaves would be returned simply because they had once been slaves in America.
Abraham Johnson escaped from a Virginia plantation on a stolen horse in 1834. He eventually found his way to Detroit and Windsor, but was captured by a slave catcher. Canadian authorities intervened and refused to allow Johnson to be returned to the United States. Michigan’s territorial governor Stevens Mason involved himself in the case, arguing that he wanted Johnson back not because he was a slave but because he had committed a capital crime: horse theft. Mason was told that while Johnson had indeed stolen the horse, he had done so in order to escape slavery and so the crime was justifiable. A precedent was set. It appeared that anyone could do just about anything as long as it was part of an effort to escape slavery.
American authorities were not surprisingly displeased by the Canadian laws and the way they were being interpreted and enforced. In 1842, theWebster-Ashburton Treaty had been negotiated between Britain’s privy councillor Alexander Baring, First Baron of Ashburton, and American secretary of state Daniel Webster. Their primary goal was to settle the boundary disputes on the Maine–New Brunswick border and on Lake Superior’s northwest shore. Tangential to the negotiations were questions arising from the
Creole
Affair. In 1841, a ship called the
Creole
was transporting 135 American slaves from Virginia to New Orleans when the slaves took control of the ship. Several of the nineteen crew members were killed. The ship was forced to shore at British-controlled Nassau, where authorities freed the slaves. Despite President Tyler’s pleas and threats, the slaves were not returned. Eager to alleviate the tension that had developed from the incident and to avoid future misunderstandings, Ashburton and Webster wrote up extradition procedures and tacked them on to the agreement in a tenth article of the treaty. They would leave it to others to establish a more complete extradition agreement later. * By 1859, however, later had yet to arrive. Consequently, Anderson’s life was to be decided by an interpretation of the treaty’s hastily devised tenth article.
Anderson had a friend named Wynne, whom he had known for some time. The two had shared stories of escape and for years Wynne had known Anderson’s true identity, of his having stabbed a man while fleeing, and of the Missouri officials probably still on his trail. As sometimes happens with friends, a trivial disagreement in the spring of 1860 turned into a falling out. But Wynne took it further. He reported Anderson to a local magistrate named William Matthews, who did as his duty implied. The next day, while Anderson was tapping a maple tree, a sheriff approached and without incident arrested him.
While Anderson languished in the Brantford jail, Matthews sent a message to police in Detroit. They dispatched Samuel Port with the original Missouri warrant for Anderson’s arrest for having killed Digges. At a brief hearing, despite never having seen Anderson before, Port identified him as Digges’s slayer. Matthews then informed Port that Andersonwould be held until the proper extradition papers were received. American detective James Gunning took charge of the case and directed cables to Missouri and Washington asking for help. American secretary of state Lewis Cass became personally involved in expediting the matter.
While waiting for the American response, Matthews interviewed Anderson, who was forthright about his escape and about having stabbed a man who was trying to stop him. Until that conversation, Anderson did not know Digges’s name or the fact that he had died of his