order, and cannot really grasp the motor that sets it in
motion. Our analysis must focus its attention rather on the productive
dimension ofbiopower.11
TheProduction of Life
The question ofproduction in relation to biopower and the society
ofcontrol, however, reveals a real weakness ofthe work ofthe
authors from whom we have borrowed these notions. We should
clarify, then, the ‘‘vital’’ or biopolitical dimensions of Foucault’s
work in relation to the dynamics ofproduction. Foucault argued
in several works in the mid-1970s that one cannot understand the
passage from the ‘‘sovereign’’ state of the ancien re´gime to the
modern ‘‘disciplinary’’ state without taking into account how the
biopolitical context was progressively put at the service ofcapitalist
accumulation: ‘‘The control ofsociety over individuals is not con-
ducted only through consciousness or ideology, but also in the
body and with the body. For capitalist society biopolitics is what
is most important, the biological, the somatic, the corporeal.’’12
One ofthe central objectives ofhis research strategy in this
period was to go beyond the versions ofhistorical materialism,
including several variants ofMarxist theory, that considered the
problem ofpower and social reproduction on a superstructural level
separate from the real, base level of production. Foucault thus
attempted to bring the problem ofsocial reproduction and all the
elements ofthe so-called superstructure back to within the material,
fundamental structure and define this terrain not only in economic
terms but also in cultural, corporeal, and subjective ones. We can
thus understand how Foucault’s conception ofthe social whole was
perfected and realized when in a subsequent phase of his work he
uncovered the emerging outlines ofthe society ofcontrol as a figure
ofpower active throughout the entire biopolitics ofsociety. It
does not seem, however, that Foucault—even when he powerfully
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T H E P O L I T I C A L C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E P R E S E N T
grasped the biopolitical horizon ofsociety and defined it as a field
ofimmanence—ever succeeded in pulling his thought away from
that structuralist epistemology that guided his research from the
beginning. By structuralist epistemology here we mean the reinven-
tion ofa functionalist analysis in the realm ofthe human sciences,
a method that effectively sacrifices the dynamic of the system, the
creative temporality ofits movements, and the ontological substance
ofcultural and social reproduction.13 In fact, if at this point we
were to ask Foucault who or what drives the system, or rather,
who is the ‘‘bios,’’ his response would be ineffable, or nothing at
all. What Foucault fails to grasp finally are the real dynamics of
production in biopolitical society.14
By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari present us with a properly
poststructuralist understanding ofbiopower that renews materialist
thought and grounds itselfsolidly in the question ofthe production
ofsocial being. Their work demystifies structuralism and all the
philosophical, sociological, and political conceptions that make the
fixity of the epistemological frame an ineluctable point of reference.
They focus our attention clearly on the ontological substance of
social production. Machines produce. The constant functioning of
social machines in their various apparatuses and assemblages pro-
duces the world along with the subjects and objects that constitute
it. Deleuze and Guattari, however, seem to be able to conceive
positively only the tendencies toward continuous movement and
absolute flows, and thus in their thought, too, the creative elements
and the radical ontology ofthe production ofthe social remain
insubstantial and impotent. Deleuze and Guattari discover the pro-
ductivity ofsocial reproduction (creative production, production
of values, social relations, affects, becomings), but