complete account of all of the Army of the Potomac’s movements since leaving the Rappahannock line and up to the last forty-eight hours, and in particular he had even more recent news about the command of the Union army, “of the removal of Hooker and the appointment of George Meade to command of the Army of the Potomac.” Longstreet was at once “on fire at such news,” and sent Harrison with an aide to rouse Lee, who listened to Harrison’s report with “great composure and minuteness.” This confirmed what Lee already suspected: that the Army of the Potomac was shaking itself into pieces that Lee could turn upon and beat one by one, with all the odds in his favor. If he succeeded in “crushing Meade’s army, Philadelphia will be at his mercy, or he may come downon Washington in its rear.” Nor was he apprehensive about the Army of the Potomac’s new commander. He appraised Meade with remarkable accuracy when he remarked that “General Meade will commit no blunder in my front, and if I commit one he will make haste to take advantage of it”—an elegant way of saying that George Meade would likely do nothing rather than run the risks of doing something.
So, rather than wait to be hunted by the Yankees (which is what Longstreet believed Lee had promised back inVirginia), Lee would go hunting himself for the climactic victory he had always wanted. “Ah! General, the enemy is a long time finding us,” Lee remarked toJohn Bell Hood, when Longstreet’s junior division commander stopped by to pay his respects. “If he does not succeed soon, we must go in search of him.” And he now had a fairly good idea of where the searching should begin. “We will not move to Harrisburg, as we expected,” Lee announced to his staff on the afternoon of the 29th, “but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.” 29
The only unhappy person in theArmy of Northern Virginia seemed to be Dick Ewell, whose heart had been set on capturing Harrisburg, and his men, who “expected to go to Philadelphia or New York.” Do not “destroy any of the barracks at Carlisle,” Ewell ordered the commander of his rear guard, “as he hoped we would return there in a few days and would want to occupy them again.” 30
PART 2
The First Day
PART 3
The Second Day
CHAPTER TWENTY
Let us have no more retreats
O N THE 5TH OF M ARCH , 1864, George Gordon Meade sat down before SenatorBenjamin Franklin Wade to contribute his testimony to what he had been disingenuously advised was the desire of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War to create “a sort of history of the war.” Meade was not fooled by this, or by the smiling assurance of “Bluff Ben” Wade that this was not an inquisition and that there were no “charges against me.” Three days before, on the floor of the Senate, Wade’sRadical Republican colleagueMorton Wilkinson accused Meade of ordering “a retreat” from Gettysburg, and Meade was only too well aware that “Generals Sickles and Doubleday” had been whispering to the committee about a directive Meade had composed for a withdrawal toPipe Creek on July 2nd.
For three hours, Meade “gave … a full history of all the circumstances attending the battle of Gettysburgh, and also of his subsequent conduct.” A week later, Meade appeared again before committee—in this case, Wade alone—with copies of the orders he had issued for the Army of the Potomac’s concentration at Gettysburg, and a month later he submitted a written statement unequivocally denying that he had ever issued or authorized such an order; then came a procession of witnesses to contradict him. Meade was then directed to return to the committee for a third round of testimony. This time, Meade’s fiery temper was only barely in restraint: “I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall