Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 by Hector C. Bywater Read Free Book Online Page B

destruction. As we now know, a belief was cherished in Washington that, as at Chemulpo in 1904, the Japanese would make a combined naval and military attack on the islands, in which case they would have to bring crowded transports with the fleet. If that were done, the American squadron, small though it was, might be able to inflict sufficient damage to compensate for its own destruction.
    But this theory of a combined attack postulated a very imperfect knowledge of the laws of strategy on the part of the Japanese. In all their previous campaigns they had shown themselves well acquainted with those laws, and there was no reason to suppose they would ignore them now. If they did attempt to throw troops ashore in the Philippines before the American squadron had been disposed of, it could only be because they feared the arrival of reinforcements from the United States, and wished to make themselves masters of the islands before these could come on the scene. But, in fact, there was no such imperative need for haste. At least three weeks must elapse ere a large American fleet, attended by its slow fuel ships and other essential auxiliaries, could cross the Pacific even if it steamed all the way at its highest collective speed and was not molested en route . But although they doubted whether the American battle fleet would be despatched to Asiatic waters, the Japanese had made all preparations to receive it, and could count with confidence on delaying its arrival until they had worked their will in the Philippines.
    So when Vice-Admiral Hiraga steamed south to settle accounts with the American Asiatic fleet he took no military transports with him. His force consisted of three battlecruisers — Kongo (flagship), Hiyei , and Kirishima ; six light cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and the airplane carrier Hosho . The speed of the slowest ship was twenty-five knots.
    The disparity between this fleet and the American squadron was immense. Admiral Ribley’s two armoured cruisers had a nominal speed of twenty-two knots, but so long as the squadron kept together its pace must be regulated by that of the slowest unit, and the three old cruisers of the Denver class were not good for more than fifteen knots. In gun power the Japanese superiority was overwhelming. Counting only heavy pieces, they had twenty-four 14-inch guns, which could range up to 24,000 yards; to which the Americans could oppose but four 10-inch and four 8-inch guns, whose extreme range was 15,000 yards. As the three old Denver cruisers simply did not count as fighting units, the only other vessels that could play any useful role in action were the ten destroyers, three light mine-layers, and twelve submarines. There was also the airplane carrier Curtiss , a 22- knot ship which carried fourteen planes, six of which were equipped for torpedo attack. Had Admiral Ribley chosen to remain inside Manila Bay, he would probably have been safe for the time being, for the Japanese, knowing 12-inch guns to be mounted in the batteries of Corregidor which guard the entrance, would have hesitated to send in their big ships.
    But if the squadron stayed at Manila there was very little chance of its ever coming out again, as the enemy would be sure to seal the channel with mines laid by submarines, besides keeping a strong blockading force near at hand. And with the American squadron safely bottled up there would be nothing to stop the Japanese transports from putting to sea. The investment of Port Arthur in 1904 had provided ample warning of what would follow. Landing, as it was expected to do, at points on the coast of Luzon well away from the batteries at Manila, the invading army would advance towards that city and bring the bay under artillery fire, making it a deathtrap for the American ships. As the garrison of Luzon, including native troops, did not exceed 17,000 men, they could not hope to fight more than a delaying action against an army of 80,000, which was the minimum number