Henri II: His Court and Times by H Noel Williams Read Free Book Online Page A

the occupation of Pavia would exercise
pressure on Florence and the Papacy, for Clement VII, at the
first sign of Imperial failure, had begun to veer towards
France; Pavia would serve as a base for an advance on
Naples; after all, sooner or later, it must be besieged, for its
powerful garrison could not be left in the rear of a force with
a long line of communications stretching from Naples back to
Milan."
    F RANÇOIS I K ING OF F RANCE
FROM AN ENGRAVING AFTER THE DRAWING IN THE BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE
    But François committed a fatal error when, contrary to the
advice of La Palice, the new Constable, 23 he proceeded to weaken his army by detaching 4,000 men to attack Genoa and
sending nearly three times that number, under John Stuart,
the last Duke of Albany, 24 to the frontier of Naples. For Antonio de Leyva succeeded in
inspiring the garrison and citizens of Pavia with his own indomitable spirit, and the
stubborn defence of the town caused the siege to degenerate
into a blockade and gave time to Pescara to reorganise his forces
behind the shelter of the Adda; to Bourbon to return from
Germany with a strong force of
landsknechts
, which his great
name had attracted to his banner; and to Lannoy, the Viceroy
of Naples, to join his colleagues at the head of a considerable
body of Spaniards and Italians.
    Towards the end of January, the Imperialists quitted their
camp at Lodi, 25 and advanced to the relief of Pavia. François's
most prudent officers, La Palice, La Trémoille, and the Grand
Master of the Artillery, Galiot de Génouillac, warned him of
the danger of permitting himself to be shut in between the
relieving army and the garrison of Pavia, and urged that they
should temporarily raise the siege and retire on Milan, or
occupy a strong defensive position in the environs. Bonnivet
and the junior officers, however, cried out with one voice
against this proposal, the former declaring that "we other
Frenchmen are not accustomed to make war by military
artifices, but with banners waving, particularly when we have
for general a valiant king, who ought to inspire the greatest
poltroons to combat bravely." 26 Such advice was too much in accord with François's own inclinations
not to be acceptable, and he accordingly determined to remain
before Pavia.
    It must be admitted that the position which he took up was
one of great strength. Earthworks bristling with cannon protected his front; his right was sheltered by the Ticino; while
his left lay within the high walls of the park of Mirabello,
the favourite villa of the dukes of Milan, whose beauties had
been so often celebrated by the poets and artists of Italy.
    For three weeks the Imperialists remained in sight of the
French camp without attempting any decisive movement,
though they succeeded in throwing a supply of ammunition
into Pavia. By that time their provisions were exhausted,
and it was only with the greatest difficulty that their generals
could prevent the army from disbanding. On the other hand,
François's forces had been still further reduced by the withdrawal
of 6,000 Swiss mercenaries, who had been recalled
to the Grisons to defend their valleys against a
condottiere
in the pay of Charles V, who had seized Chiavenna, on
Lake Como. Their departure, however, left the French still
superior to the enemy, particularly in cavalry and artillery.
At length, faced with the alternative of fighting or disbanding,
the Imperialist generals decided to attack, 27 and in the early hours of St. Matthias's Day (February 24) they advanced to
the assault of the French position. During the night, several
companies of soldiers and sappers had been detached to
breach the Mirabello wall, which, as we have mentioned,
covered the French left, and had succeeded in doing so in
three places; and it was on these points that the Imperialists
directed their attack.
    Accounts of the battle which followed are many and unusually
conflicting, but the following details seem to be