Licensed to Kill by Robert Young Pelton Read Free Book Online Page A

commanders named Kabir and Zaibdullah headed up a contingent of one hundred seventy. Billy describes Commander Zaibdullah as a “no-good cheatin’ shithead,” a well-paid ally “who was not to be trusted under any circumstances.” Almost immediately the Afghans under Kabir had begun to act suspiciously, and the team felt in jeopardy.
    Billy was used to dealing with criminals and warlords, but it soon became obvious that they were not going to catch bin Laden in this murky world of shifting and dual allegiances. The CIA estimates that it handed out $70 million in cash to win the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan and considered it a bargain, even though the loyalty the money was supposed to buy did not lead to the death or capture of bin Laden or many of his minions.
    The Afghans hired by the CIA and trained by Special Forces also included Zahim Khan and Pacha Khan Zadran, a thuggish-looking warlord who would later call in a U.S. air strike to target a delegation of Pashtun tribal elders on their way to congratulate Hamid Karzai in Kabul. It was the duplicity and character of America’s Afghan proxies that ensured that the bulk of the Arab, Pakistani, and Uzbek jihadis would slip away, and that bin Laden would never be found.
    Billy remembers the hardships of Afghanistan, but his best memories remain of the new generation of contractors and paramilitaries he got to know. “What I have noticed is that the new lads of the paramilitary are stronger, better-trained, more able with communications, have wonderful gear, can shoot straighter, and generally outshine the old-school lads…. However, their on-the-ground decision making has become anon-occurring event. Commo is just too good, and all decisions are rendered up the chain of command.
    â€œIn my time before we had all these radios and high-tech communications, decisions were rendered by old-schoolers in the field without fear of wrath from the hierarchy. But these days, decisions are strictly arrived at by the same hierarchy,” some several hundred miles from the combat zone.
    Much to his disappointment, Billy’s time in Afghanistan never did bring him face-to-face with his old nemesis, Osama bin Laden. Even the locals he worked with seemed too eager to take his money and too reticent to root out the enemy. He would have preferred the heat of the Cambodian jungle, as the cold up in the mountains made his joints ache. He smelled bad and began to think that maybe he was, as he puts it, “too old for this shit.” After two months in-country, Billy Waugh said farewell to ODA 594, heading home in mid-January. It was going to be up to somebody else to capture Billy’s nemesis.
    Enter Blackwater
    The use of contractors in the War on Terror started with Billy Waugh’s five dozen recruits, an ad hoc paramilitary force of firepower and expertise whose rapid deployment filled an important role in helping the American offensive adapt quickly to the unconventional terrain. As it had done in Laos and other covert conflicts, America had effectively “outsourced” aspects of the War on Terror to retired military and local indigenous mercenaries. After the decimation of the Taliban, the CIA would be working to set up an extensive intelligence network in Afghanistan and Pakistan to help hunt down Osama bin Laden and remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The CIA’s decision to hire a corporation to bolster personal protection teams for CIA officers would catalyze one company’s first foray into the private security industry. The initial $5.4-million six-month contract began Blackwater’s transformation from a minor steel-target manufacturer and shooting-range into a massive security conglomerate.
    Before 9/11, Erik Prince was working to make his business profitable. Although Prince had grown up immersed in a world of business acquisition and expansion, the original Blackwater model seemed to cater more to