Living Silence in Burma by Christina Fink Read Free Book Online Page A

the ethnic minorities could do little to stop measures supported by the far more numerous Burman representatives. Frustrated Kachins began talking about armed resistance.
    In the meantime, U Nu continued to meet with ethnic leaders to discuss their demands. He offered amnesties to ethnic fighters who surrendered, but he was finding it difficult to work out a settlement with the Shans and Karennis, who were considering seceding. Most Burman politicians continued to oppose increased political autonomy for the ethnic minorities. As Dr Ba Maw, a Burman who served as prime minister during the Japanese occupation, put it: ‘The Burmese as a rule show a big-race mentality in their dealings with the smaller native races; they find it hard to forget their long historical domination over those races.’ 26 Even though some of the ethnic areas had never been under Burman domination, most Burmans still very much wanted the minority areas to remain part of modern Burma.
    By 1961, Shan and Kachin nationalists were organizing resistance armies along the lines of the Karen. They increasingly felt that negotiating with the government was pointless. Still, older and more prominent minority leaders remained committed to working out a solution with the elected government. It was on 2 March 1962, during a high-level seminar on federal issues attended by Prime Minister U Nu and senior Shan representatives, that General Ne Win again seized power. This time, U Nu, members of his government and many Shan leaders were arrested.
    General Ne Win’s colleague, Brigadier Aung Gyi, justified the coup by insisting that the union was in danger of disintegrating. A month after the coup, General Ne Win declared that parliamentary democracy, as practised so far, had not worked. The new military government, it was implied, could manage the country’s affairs more effectively.
    Even though most people had voted against the military-backed Stable AFPFL in 1960, two years later they were willing to give the military another chance. In part, people were disappointed with how democratic rule had functioned, and there was hope that General Ne Win would act in the nation’s best interest. Others were cynical about government in general. Burmese have traditionally identified the government as one of the five enemies, the others being fire, water (floods and storms), thieves and malevolent people. Ordinary people had never had much control over the political process and felt it was best just to get on with life regardless of who was in power.
    The major political parties stayed quiet, but some student groups did make statements against the coup. Within the military itself, particularly among those who had worked with the British before independence, there was also some opposition. One man who was a high-ranking naval officer at the time later said: ‘Some of us worried that now Ne Win was here to stay. We did get from the British the idea of the separation of politics and the military.’ Bo Let Ya, a popular member of the Thirty Comrades, sent out word that all former military comrades should state as a group that the military should not stay in power. He was arrested.
    General Ne Win had already eliminated many of his rivals within the military the year before. Telling U Nu that they had been involved in election irregularities in 1960, he had eleven senior officers expelled from the army and others transferred to inactive posts. Although General Ne Win had started life with little promise, having dropped out of university and worked as a postal clerk, he had come a long way. He was admired for being a man of action and, as one of the Thirty Comrades, he was viewed as untouchable. He had expanded the army from a few thousand men in 1948 to 100,000 in 1962, and with his close rivals removed, the lower ranks were willing to follow him obediently, whether out of respect or fear.
    In retrospect, one can ask how things might have been different if General Aung San had