Lone Wolf Terrorism by Jeffrey D. Simon Read Free Book Online Page B

identified. Tiny conspiracies, however, remain hard to detect. Lone operators, unless they reach out to others for moral reinforcement or material support, are almost impossible to know about, and they have proved themselves capable of carrying out large-scale violence and sustaining long campaigns.
    Technological advances have increased the lethality of the lone wolf. Guns have made murder easier. Today's mass killers have access to ever-greater firepower. The invention of dynamite further enhanced the destructive power of the individual. With a single bomb, an individual can bring down an airliner, killing hundreds. Chemical and biological weapons also increase the capacity of the individual to kill in quantity. At the time of his capture, the Alphabet Bomber was working on the production of nerve gas. The anthrax letters, which terrorized the country in 2001, are believed to have been sent by a single individual. The Internet can be a source of inspiration, moral reinforcement, and practical instruction for potential killers.
    America's principal current concern continues to be al Qaeda's global terrorist campaign. Under continuing pressure, al Qaeda today is more decentralized and more dependent on its affiliates and allies and on its ability to radicalize and recruit individuals to carry out terrorist attacks at home.
    Approximately two-thirds of the homegrown al Qaeda–inspired terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 have involved a single individual. Only a few of these individuals actually had physical contact with al Qaeda abroad. Having traveled to training camps run by al Qaeda or its allies, these individuals received instruction and were sent back to the United States to prepare and carry out terrorist attacks. A greater number were inspired by one-way contact with alQaeda websites or by online correspondence with al Qaeda communicators. Some of the plotters thought they were in contact with al Qaeda operatives, but these turned out to be police undercover agents—a majority of the most advanced plots were FBI sting operations.
    The term lone wolf would apply only to a few of these terrorist plotters. The behavior of many resembled more that of stray dogs. They sniffed at the edges of al Qaeda's extremist ideology, participated vicariously in its online jihad, exhorting each other to action, carelessly throwing down threats, boasting of their prowess as warriors, of the heroic deeds they were ready to perform, barking, showing their teeth, hesitating, then darting forward until ensnared by the law. What drives them?
    When I was testifying before the Senate Homeland Security Committee shortly after Major Hasan's murderous attack at Fort Hood, committee chairman Joe Liebermann asked, “Some have called Major Hasan a terrorist while others have described him as a deeply troubled man. Where do you come down, Mr. Jenkins?” I responded that “the two descriptions are not mutually exclusive—terrorism is not an activity that attracts the well-adjusted.” Can we make a distinction?
    To achieve consensus on a definition of terrorism in the 1970s, it was necessary to maintain sharp boundaries. Terrorism was politically motivated violence. While terrorists committed crimes in the classic sense, terrorism differed from ordinary crime in its objectives. Political content was a criterion of terrorism. Crime might produce terror, but ordinary criminals were not terrorists.
    Just as we sought to draw a line between the terrorist and the ordinary criminal, we also tried to distinguish terrorists from violent lunatics. Crazies, by definition, could not be terrorists.
    Some governments were prone to attach the pejorative label “terrorist” to all their political foes. But the United States achieved its independence through force of arms and recognized the right of armed rebellion. Armed rebellion is not itself terrorism, although rebels might carry out acts of terror. So might