Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism by Omid Safi Read Free Book Online Page B

be found in the madrasas. The traditional curriculum was based on the memorization of the foundational texts (Qur’an, etc.), and learning the rigorous methodology by which one could arrive at a religious opinion. How strange it must seem to many modern Muslims to read a pre-modern theologian like Ghazzali offer an opinion in such a fashion: The following group holds this opinion, while group 2 states something to the contrary. Group 3 is still different, holding to such-and-such a belief, while group 4 follows this practice. As for myself (i.e., Ghazzali himself), I find myself
    in accordance with the views of the third group.
    How refreshing! How intellectually honest, to summarize the perspectives of various schools of thought, to legitimize a range of opinions and to acknowledge a spectrum of interpretations! It is then, and only then, that a learned scholar like Ghazzali would situate himself in that wider spectrum. Such a willingness to undertake self-positioning may not have been the norm, but it was utilized by some of the leading pre-modern Muslim thinkers. How different is this attitude from so many contemporary Muslim pundits who hijack an entire tradition, claiming to be a one-man (and it is almost always a man) spokesperson for all Muslims: “Islam states... .” No debate, no discussion, no spectrum of perspectives. The Almighty Islam has spoken, or so we are told, and the conversation is over.
    It is above all the rigor displayed by pre-modern thinkers like Ghazzali that is sorely missing from contemporary madrasa training. With few exceptions (Iran, for example), the brightest minds in the Muslim world are no longer found in madrasas. Instead, they are training to be doctors, engineers, computer scientists, and lawyers. Good for them. And bad for us. It is a sad reality that in many places in the Muslim world, the madrasas now attract many of the weaker students who could not make it into more competitive schools of higher education. In other places, such as Pakistan, many of these madrasas have become at best institutions of social welfare providing free room and board, and at worst a breeding ground for the most virulent type of fanaticism.
    The decline of the traditional Islamic educational system has had another important consequence: many of the leading Muslim intellectuals in the world today have achieved their intellectual and spiritual understanding of Islam largely outside the traditional madrasa curriculum. That is certainly the case for the contributors to this volume. While a few of us (Ebrahim Moosa, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and Farid Esack) have studied in traditional madrasas, all of us have grown in our understanding of Islam through Ph.D. programs in Islamic studies at Western (or Western-style) universities. Without the benefit of a traditional madrasa curriculum, there are surely some limitations to our arguments. No doubt there are many advantages as well, since we have enjoyed the room and latitude to approach old problems from new perspectives. In a real sense, lay Muslim intellectuals and activists are now stepping into the vacuum created by the marginalization of the traditional Islamic madrasas. This is particularly the case given that many of the products of the contemporary madrasa system have failed to address issues of social justice, pluralism, and gender justice.
    Yet the same gap that in a sense has created room for us also makes our task much more difficult. So many contemporary conversations about Islam in the crucial realms of law and theology would be laughed out of any medieval madrasa, with the accusations of superficiality and lack of rigor. As Khaled Abou El Fadl has pointed out, this has also resulted in a situation where pseudo-scholars and quasi-muftis now issue “Islamic verdicts” that often follow authoritarian tendencies. Examples could include Osama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for the murder of American civilians. All of this makes the task of progressives