Real Peace by Richard Nixon Read Free Book Online Page A

arsenal before he loses it. Any arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union must be based on true equality and must assure strategic stability. Neither can be secure unless both feel secure.
    An arms control agreement could reduce the costs of defense for both the United States and the Soviet Union. President Reagan’s proposal in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks calls for each side to dismantle part of its nuclear arsenal and to curb the deployment of even more accurate land-based missiles. If the Soviets accept this approach, it would stop not only the spiral of the arms race but also that of the defense budget.
    Achieving arms control is a political imperative. Western leaders will be unable to mobilize public support behind the defense spending necessary to keep up our deterrent unless they have a credible policy of negotiating arms control. The current debate over the production of the MX missile demonstrates this vividly.
    Arms control between the superpowers is the first step in controlling nuclear proliferation. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons technology to other countries is in the interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union. If scores of minor powers acquire nuclear weapons, the chances are great that one will someday use them in a crisis in one of the world’s hotspots. Nuclear proliferation could turn out to be the spark that explodes the global nuclear tinderbox. To stop it the superpowers must work together. Only if they succeed in capping their own nuclear buildup can they have any influence over smaller powers that are thinking of developing nuclear weapons.
    But while weighing the potential benefits of arms control, we must recognize the hard reality that it will improve the chances for peace only under certain conditions.
    An arms control agreement will not contribute to peace unless we reduce the political differences that can lead to war. Avid arms control proponents reject the concept of linking arms control negotiations to political issues. But linkage is a fact of international life. It was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that destroyed the chances for Senate approval of SALT II. This was linkage in action, not just in theory.
    We should not pursue arms control as an end in itself. It is dangerous to assume that any arms control agreement is better than none. If an agreement is to reduce the risk of war, it must advance six goals.
    First, it must create a true balance between the superpowers. All arms control treaties are not created equal, and any we sign must be based on equality. Equality in numbers is important, but numbers should not be the sole measure of equality. For the United States to have an equal number of weapons as the Soviet Union is not enough if the Soviets alone are allowed to retain their present first-strike capability. We should set the number and size of missiles and the number of warheads so that each side has the same military capability in both strategic and medium-range weapons.
    Second, it must not allow either superpower to have a credible first-strike capability. If both were to have this capability, each would be strongly tempted in a crisis to preemptively attack the strategic forces of the other. What would be worse, if an agreement gave superiority in first-strike weapons to an offensive power like the Soviet Union, it would actually increase the danger of war and of defeat without war.
    We should formally offer to share any technology we develop for a space-based missile defense system with the Soviet Union or any other nation that joins us in seeking meaningful arms control. If all nations could deploy the system at once, none would suspect another of wanting to use it as a shield for an attack.
    Third, it must provide the means for each side to verify the compliance of the other. We have relied in the past on satellite photography and other national means of verification. But advances in military technology