federal treasury.
Though Kemp had been a Ford delegate in Kansas City (mainly because of a personal relationship with Ford from their days together in Congress), Reagan did not hesitate to get behind the young congressman's tax-cut plan. After his initial radio commentary on Kemp's bill in the fall of 1976, Reagan did another five-minute broadcast endorsing Kemp's idea in late March 1977. It was a “tax plan based on common sense,” Reagan said, reminding listeners of the success of the Kennedy tax cuts of the early 1960s. 54
B Y THE SUMMER OF 1977 Reagan had emerged as the most high-profile and vocal critic of the Carter administration, scoring it on policy and politics and hypocrisy.
In the month of June alone, Reagan made thirteen major policy speeches in New York, Washington, and other locations while keeping up with his daily radio commentaries and his twice-a-week column. He went after Carter over détente and his desire to recognize Vietnam, which Reagan charged with “holding an estimated nineteen million people in forced captivity, including some in concentration camps.” 55
He also hit Carter on the forthcoming Panama Canal treaties, 56 for which the Carter White House had scheduled a signing ceremony on September 7. During the 1976 primaries Reagan had come out strongly against any agreement that gaveup U.S. control over the Panama Canal, decrying such a move as a “giveaway” of the canal to Omar Torrijos, the military strongman of Panama. In fact, Reagan's near-successful comeback against Gerald Ford had been due in large part to his exploitation of this issue. If Ford never heard again Reagan's refrain from 1976—“We built it! We paid for it! It's ours! And we're going to keep it!” 57 —it would be too soon. The Carter White House attempted to persuade Reagan to support the documents it had negotiated, but after considerable contemplation he demurred. He returned to the theme he had sounded during the campaign, citing his concern that the United States would surrender the “rights of sovereignty we acquired in the original treaty.” 58
Not every conservative sided with Reagan on the canal issue. Most notably, National Review editor William F. Buckley Jr. and actor John Wayne, both friends of Reagan's for many years, publicly supported the treaties. The fight over the canal came to define the resurgent conservatives and the growing New Right. Reagan talked about the issue so often, he opened up one radio broadcast by saying, “Would it shock & surprise you if I did a little talking about the Panama Canal? I hope not because that's what I'm going to do.” 59 He called Carter's efforts to rally support “a medicine show, a wave of propaganda.” 60 At the end of every commentary came his signature signoff, “This is Ronald Reagan. Thanks for listening.”
Although the Panama Canal treaties would still need to receive the votes of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate—by no means a certain proposition—the Carter administration went ahead with an extravagant signing ceremony featuring Torrijos and Carter on the White House lawn. The media and the liberal establishment were startled to see large crowds of protesters mobilized that day on Capitol Hill and outside the White House. 61
Conservative groups in Washington were meeting, often daily, to coordinate their grassroots lobbying, advertising, public relations, and direct-mail efforts to stop the treaties. Reagan gave a speech to the National Press Club in early September blasting Carter over the issue; he cut more radio commentaries on the subject; he also testified before the Senate outlining his opposition. 62
Meanwhile, a letter went out under Reagan's signature on behalf of the RNC, asking for money to help stop Carter's initiative. “I'm convinced the only way to defeat the Carter negotiated treaty is to conduct a full-fledged campaign to alert citizens to the dangers Republicans see in this treaty,” Reagan wrote. “Believe