cash power to work around the world, with Chinese companies investing directly in myriad foreign entities. Whether pursuing private equity in Western companies or investing in Africa’s vast natural-resources boom, China is energetically buying into other nations’ economies and taking a share in future development. The Russians, while no match for the economically mighty Chinese, have also pursued their interests with renewed vigor, especially as their gasdominance is threatened by American fracking and other challenges. The Russians have been applying bare-knuckled political pressure to persuade their former Soviet neighbors to join the Customs Union rather than the EU, as many have been contemplating. These efforts have already borne fruit with Armenia, which was set to join the EU; when Russia started to sell arms to Azerbaijan, Armenia’s bitter enemy, Armenia reversed course and sided with the Russians. Moscow is bullying Moldova and Ukraine in similar fashion and has apparently proved successful in the latter case.
And there’s still more. Rogue nations such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea, and terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah all have directly benefited from the patronage—both direct and indirect—of the Russians and the Chinese. Much of the assistance is covert or indirect, but it is also the case that increasingly, Iran and North Korea have expanded their nuclear programs with the economic and arguably the technological assistance of the Russians and Chinese. There is room for disagreement about the precise degree to which the Russians have aided the Iranians; and the Chinese, the North Koreans. We will probably never uncover all the facts. But we’ve learned enough to point unmistakably to deep-seated ties and substantial, critical support. Moreover, Russian and Chinese intentions in this area are evident in both nations’ intransigence at the UN and elsewhere when they’re asked to rein in the behavior of their rogue allies.
As this book went to press, it had become clear to most observers that American influence in the Middle East has declined precipitously. Russia is rebuilding its influence there to levels not seen since the height of the Cold War. We cannot directly blame the Russians for Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, but it’s crucial to understand that Russian patronage of Syria—from steadfast political support for Assad to economic and military assistance—made it possible for the dictator to use chemical weapons and then to engage in a negotiatingprocess that prevented a U.S. strike against Syria. Assad has an excellent chance of staying in power indefinitely, despite the so-called red line that President Obama drew in August 2012. The president’s stupefying walk-back from that red line, as well as his retreat from his earlier public position that Assad had to go, have sent an unmistakable message of American weakness to our foes. We spy on our own and spy on foreign leaders with impunity but have been far less successful influencing events positively and proactively in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Africa, or Asia. In fact, our impotence has been obvious, apparent, and clear for a number of years now even to our allies; countries such as Saudi Arabia and Japan increasingly pursue their own policies and interests with much less deference to American interests and concerns. Indeed, Egypt has now recently moved closer to Russia politically and economically. Even Israel, our oldest ally in the Middle East, has increasingly demonstrated its independence, with its leaders distancing themselves from Secretary of State John Kerry and making energy deals with India and other countries—deals the U.S. views with suspicion and concern.
We wrote this book as a warning about the threat America faces. Others have made many of these individual arguments elsewhere. But as we examined each of the disparate issues we have joined together
Susan Sontag, Victor Serge, Willard R. Trask
Robert Jordan, Brandon Sanderson