Secret Journey to Planet Serpo by Len Kasten Read Free Book Online Page A

were overwhelmed by the numbers of personnel scurrying about like ants, but what was impressive was the huge constructions that were being built. From what we were witnessing, the Nazis, it appeared, had been on Antarctica a long time.” He says he was very impressed by the advanced Nazi technology. The team was discovered and fought a heroic engagement while being chased after setting the mines in place. Only three survived the encounter, but they succeeded in detonating massive explosions at the mouth of the tunnel, and sealing it so that no entrance remained. After being evacuated to the Falkland Islands, the three survivors were told that their mission was to remain top secret. The SAS agent says, “Upon reaching South Georgia, we were issued with . . . a directive that we were forbidden to reveal what we had seen, heard or even encountered.”

    British newspaper report of the Doenitz appointment
    OPERATION HIGHJUMP
    Clearly, the United States did find out about Operation Tabarin, either by covert intelligence operations or by deliberate intelligence sharing by the British. The latter seems more likely because the British were probably convinced they had not succeeded in destroying the base, and wanted the U.S. to finish the job. Also, the OSS had learned a great deal from the interrogations of Wermuth and Schaeffer. Planning for Operation Highjump was initiated by Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal on August 7, 1946, less than a year after Operation Tabarin II concluded. Operation Highjump was sanctioned by order of the “Committee of Three,” consisting of the secretaries of state, war, and the navy. Presumably, the Cabinet had been advised by several intelligence agencies and already had the approval of President Harry S. Truman. This was to be a massive naval operation involving a fleet of thirteen ships, including a communications-laden flagship, two icebreakers, two destroyers, two tenders carrying three PBM (Patrol Bomber Mariner) seaplanes each, two tankers, two supply ships, one submarine, two helicopters, and the aircraft carrier USS
Philippine Sea,
carrying six DC-3 twin-engine planes equipped with both wheels and skis for landing gear. The flagship USS
Mt. Olympus
also carried a contingent of 4,700 Marines.
    War hero Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who was also then U.S. chief of naval operations, appointed Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd as director of the mission. He also named decorated veteran of polar operations, Admiral Richard H. Cruzen as task force commander. The operation was publicized as exploratory and scientific. Clearly, with the involvement of three of America’s top naval brass as well as a Marine fighting unit, this was no scientific expedition. The U.S. Marine Corps at that time was considered the toughest military organization in the world, still including in its ranks many veterans of the brutal Pacific Island campaigns only a year earlier. So this was no novice, token military force intended to accompany a scientific expedition.
    The publicity notwithstanding, the military nature of the operation was clearly stated from the top down. The Committee of Three said that the main purpose of the expedition was “consolidating and extending U.S. sovereignty over Antarctic areas, investigating possible base sites, and extending scientific knowledge in general.” Admiral Marc Mitscher, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, said that the main objective was to extend U.S. sovereignty “over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic continent.” Presumably, the presence of such a formidable fighting force implied that this sovereignty might have to be gained by military action. But that made no sense because no potential enemy was identified. So clearly, that was just a cover story, and the real intent of the mission was to covertly destroy the Nazi base. Lest there be any doubt remaining, Admiral Byrd said, “However the basic objectives were not