Shadows of Golstar by Terrence Scott Read Free Book Online

the
executive offices.
     It took several weeks of investigation for Owens
to ferret out that a particular high level SolGen officer was ripe for
blackmail. Through patient investigation, he discovered a family member of a
certain well-placed executive was a drug addict. It turned out to be the
executive’s daughter. In interviewing the daughter’s friends, Owens found the
daughter was not the soul of discretion. She had confided in one of her
friends. She had bragged she was blackmailing her father for hush money about
her drug use.  
    The suspected officer’s daughter was addicted to a
highly illegal endorphin-based drug. If the daughter’s addiction was revealed,
the legal and social implications would severely affect the family. The father
was being groomed for a higher position within the company, so to avoid scandal
and protect his pending advancement he provided money and, at times, actually
procured the drug for his daughter in exchange for her silence. 
  
    As it hadn’t taken him very long to find the potential
weak link in SolGen’s management core, Owens surmised SynthEnGen had easily
discovered the daughter’s addiction as well and had decided to exploit the
situation. Instead of demanding money, their payment was confidential company
information in exchange for silence. The executive was now entangled in two
separate blackmail schemes based on the same dirty secret.
    However, this was hearsay and speculation. Owens had
needed hard evidence, some real proof of what was going on. Bank accounts and
personal spending habits often provide the first clues. But since money wasn’t
changing hands, no fiscal audit trails existed. And until now, the suspect had
been clever enough to evade discovery. Somehow the officer was able to mask his
download access into the corporate database.
    Owens decided that the suspect would have to be caught
in the act, and to do that would call for an old-fashioned sting operation. He
took part in a number of stings while still serving as a detective in the
police department. Some had been quite elaborate, but in his experience, the
simplest scenarios usually had the greatest chances for success. He felt
certain a fairly straight-forward plan would be best to nail the culprit.
    Owens immediately went to work. In his investigation,
he had reviewed the company’s internal practices. As a result, he knew that
many high-ranking officers received bulletins on new products and could access
more detailed technical information on products that were under development. He
reasoned this was the likely source of the leak. From this questionable
practice, it was easy for him to conceive a simple trap.
    He met with selected SolGen researchers and data
managers he had personally screened. The trap was based upon providing company
officers who had regular access to new research information with unique sets of
what would appear as legitimate data. The data would relate to a single high
profile product currently under development. As usual, the officers would
receive the new-product notification through normal company channels. However,
unknown to them, each would have computer access to a distinctive set of
“tagged” technical records.  At first blush, they would all appear to be
identical, and though the differences were subtle, they became clear if you
knew where to look.    
    Owens also worked with the local judicial system and
law enforcement to have a search warrant made ready. Owens then had company
techs monitor all the terminals’ read-only access. He didn’t waste time trying
to figure out how the data was being downloaded from supposedly restricted
terminals. First, he needed to catch the thief with the marked data in his
possession. Discovering how the thief had covered his tracks would come later.
With the preparations completed, the trap was set and a new product was announced
to the corporate executives.    
    Within two days of being notified of the new product,
the