Space Debris and Other Threats From Outer Space by Joseph N. Pelton Read Free Book Online Page B

space debris or space debris mediation or collision avoidance activities separate from the active removal of space debris from orbit. Such activities, however, would be limited to no more than a set percentage of the available funds.
    Payment into this fund would “seem and feel” to satellite operators and governmental space agencies conducting space operations very much like buying launch insurance for a spacecraft mission. Indeed the fund could possibly be administered by launch insurance companies. These payments would be different in that it would only represent about a third of the cost associated with purchasing launch insurance, and rebates would eventually return half of the money paid into the fund. Further, the projected end date for the fund would establish a very real goal for accomplishing “a largely space debris-free world”. The creation of this fund and the rebate payments would reverse the current incentives that actually “encourage” the increase of orbital debris. Under current space law the owners and operators of space objects not only lack an incentive to remove their space debris from orbit; they actually face substantial financial penalties if the removal process somehow adversely affects another space object and creates liabilities which they are compelled to pay.
    The payments into the fund are actually modest when compared to the damages that will ensue once we reach the Kessler syndrome stage and debris continues to cascade out of control on an exponentially increasing basis. Indeed payments for launch insurance operations over the last three decades have varied from a low of about 6 % of total mission costs to as much as 20 % of total costs. Today typically 15 % of mission costs is for launch insurance. If one considers this wide range of payments for launch insurance and the importance of the long term sustainability of space and safe space access one should consider a 5 % orbital debris fund as not being at all excessive or unreasonable, especially if half of the money is ultimately rebated in the advent of a “clean” launch with upper stage rocket motors and launcher fairings being removed from orbit and the satellite eventually disposed of as well.
    There would appear to be merit to a flexible “economic fund” approach as opposed to seeking to create a single international agency charged with space debris remediation that would likely focus on a preferred technology and a single approach to debris removal. Licensed international entities, under the fund approach, would not be restricted to a single country. Each country or region that acted first to create orbital debris funds could also give research grants to entities embarked on developing new technology to remove debris from orbit with the latest technology.
    In short it is believed that there would be “economic and political efficiency” in having a number of licensed commercial entities capable of developing a diversity of innovative technologies to carry out space debris removal. Overall it is believed that the “economic fund” mechanism could help to create all the right incentives: (a) to reward entities for a clean launch of the satellite and removal of upper stage rockets and protective fairing covers from orbit; (b) to reward operators for removing debris properly at end of life; (c) using the “sunset provision” to establish a specific goal to get the job done; (d) using the “fund approach” (or alternatively even a prize approach) that would allow the competitive development of the best and most cost efficient technology and (e) there would be no need to “dismantle” an international agency at the end of the process.
    The Economic, Social, and Strategic Importance of Space
    Space applications have become a very diverse and increasingly important aspect of our global society. Over time space applications have expanded in scope, divided into many submarkets, and have evolved into a series of many