The General's Son: Journey of an Israeli in Palestine by Miko Peled Read Free Book Online Page A

permit Israeli ships to proceed toward the Israeli port city of Eilat. These were acts that blatantly violated the terms of the ceasefire that was signed between Egypt and Israel. The army was calling it a plausible casus belli , or justification for war.
    According to documents I found in the IDF archives and other sources, the Soviet government fed misinformation to the Egyptians, claiming that Israel was planning a surprise attack against Syria. The Soviets claimed that Israel had amassed troops on the border with Syria. Syria and Egypt had a mutual security pact, and President Nasser had to act in defense of his Syrian allies. As the Israeli cabinet was considering its options, on May 26, 1967, the Russian prime minister sent the Israeli prime minister, Levi Eshkol, a letter through the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv, calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. When the Russian ambassador presented Prime Minister Eshkol with the letter, Eshkol invited the ambassador to see with his own eyes that the claim had no merit and that Israeli troops were not amassed at the Syrian border.
    The army was recommending that Israel initiate a preemptive strike against Egypt. The cabinet was hesitant and wanted time to explore other options before committing to a full-scale war. Things came to a head in a stormy meeting of the IDF General Staff and the Israeli cabinet that took place on June 2,1967. 3 After opening remarks, my father told the cabinet in no uncertain terms that the Egyptians needed a year and a half to two years in order to be ready for a full-scale war. The other generals agreed that the Israeli army was prepared and that this was the time to strike another devastating blow.

Israeli generals preparing for battle. Generals Rabin, Bar-Lev, Peled.
     
    During this meeting, my father said to the prime minister: “Nasser is advancing an ill-prepared army because he is counting on the cabinet being hesitant. He is convinced that we will not strike. Your hesitation is working in his advantage.” In his reply to my father, the prime minister said: “The cabinet must also think of the mothers who are likely to become bereaved.”
    The generals were getting more and more frustrated and tensions ran high. Rabin, who was a heavy smoker, was said to have suffered nicotine poisoning and a nervous breakdown. They all knew what my father knew, which was that victory was imminent. In his role as chief of logistics, my father also warned that a prolonged mobilization of reservists, who had already been called up by then and comprised a significant percentage of Israel’s workforce, would cripple the country’s economy, perhaps even cause it to collapse, unless the cabinet acted decisively. “The army morale is high, and we will be victorious whether we strike today or in three weeks. But the Israeli economy cannot hold for very long. We are not prepared nor are we meant to hold through an extended period of waiting,” my father said. General Ezer Weizmann, a lifelong friend of his, threatened to resign his post as deputy chief of staff. General Ariel Sharon, who many years later would be prime minister, said that Israel must engage in a preemptive strike against the Egyptian army “and destroy it entirely without delay.”
    According to all accounts I had heard over the years by people who were present at this meeting, my father’s words to the prime minister were particularly scathing. He demanded an explanation: “Why must this army which had never lost in battle endure such an insult by the cabinet?” This exchange between the two power centers was later known as the “General’s Coup.”
    Many years later, when the issue came up in public debate, I asked my father: “What do you say to the claim that this was a coup?”
    “Nonsense!” he retorted in his typically dismissive way. He did not like to have his commitment to the state of Israel questioned, and when it was, he made his displeasure known. But he