replied.
Bailey, leaning back in her chair, intensified her look
and paused while connecting the dots of information which I had begun pouring
over to her. There was some context, some story, working in her brain but I
didn’t know what it was and sure that she wouldn’t tell me. In a joint Task,
one department takes the lead and usually that privilege lies with the
originating agency. If interested, she’d jump-in sooner rather than later, to
get the IRS on record as the agency with primary jurisdiction over the
investigation.
Bailey asked a series of follow-up questions which I
couldn’t answer. She didn’t know how little I knew. The IRS had enough now to
start a trail and to do initial inquiries to discover if there was enough
information to devote resources to an investigation.
Bailey phoned her “ P.O.C.“, short for “point of
contact”, at the UAE desk at the State Department, Anna Oliverez .
“Hi Anna, it’s Bailey at the
IRS. We’re evaluating someone for possible criminal action and were wondering
if you could release some information, if you’ve got it.”
“Hi Bailey, sure, what’s the name?”
“Adnan Qureshi . He’s got a P.O.
Box in Abu Dhabi, he’s got a home in Spain, a home in Turkey……..” Bailey
began repeating what I had told her.
“Just a minute…found him…. he’s listed as a journalist from Pakistan but we’re skeptical about his
relationships. Maybe the journalist thing is covering for something else….”
Anna’s intonation left it unclear as to whether she was raising a question or
answering one.
“Can you send me something?’ Bailey responded, now
thoroughly hooked. “Our fax machine number for classified material is
xxx-xxx”. Classified information is sent over closed, private networks, like
the ones exposed by Wikileaks .
We were hoping to have enough information from the State
Department to convince Bailey’s boss to commit to the investigation. To pass
the time while waiting for the fax to arrive from Anna, we went down to the
sandwich shop on ground level of her building and tried to make light
conversation but it was painfully superficial for both of us. We were anxious
to see what the State Department would release. Meanwhile, the men in the shop
smiled and said “hello” to Bailey; she was a sort of celebrity down there,
because of the way she looked. After a few minutes we went back upstairs with
eggs and juice and waited in the conference room until the admin poked her face
in-between the door and the wall and announced the arrival of a large incoming
fax. We stood-up and walked over to the specified machine that was making noise and dumping sheet after sheet from
Olivia, into a tray.
It was more than we expected, about 10 solid pages of intel on this one individual. We
spread out the papers on the conference table and began pouring over our
bounty. The report said that he had been the middle man involved in extracting
a fee from the truck drivers to ensure safe passage for NATO convoys carrying
supplies through the warring tribal regions of Pakistan. Selling security
through the hazardous routes earned him a place in the State Department
database. We spent all afternoon trying to analyze Qureshi ; what known groups he might be connected-to, where
his allegiance lies, where he was getting his money, where he was spending his
money, how to map his money flows, and charting his travel. There’s training on
how to create a profile on criminals and we all follow the same procedures,
modifying them only slightly to the circumstances.
Bailey was the expert at tracing flows of money, but the
psychological bent was not her strength. She dealt with fraud, embezzlement and
that type of crime but sorting out Qureshi’s motives
was a different issue. She thought he was motivated only by greed but I disagreed.
There was simply too much else going on with U.S. relations with Pakistan