deeply involved in the Ellsberg investigation and prosecution. Mardian undoubtedly understood that this could result in a mistrial for Ellsberg, who was then being tried in federal court in Los Angeles.
To assure them that he would never get caught over Watergate, Liddy told Mardian and LaRue that, unbeknownst to all, he had worked with Hunt in getting Dita Beard out of Washington during the Kleindienst hearings (Hunt had, in turn, interviewed her to see what she knew wearing a disguise), suggesting he was as elusive as Hunt. Liddy also revealed that he had shredded all the new, serialized one-hundred-dollar bills in his possession, as well as all other evidence relating to the Watergate break-ins, including wrappers from the hotel’s soap that he had brought home for his wife. Liddy also claimed he and his men had commitments for bail money, maintenance and legal fees, and told Mardian and LaRue that Hunt felt this was CRP’s responsibility. *
Mitchell was alarmed by this report, and when later testifying before the Senate Watergate committee would refer to Hunt and Liddy’s activities as the “White House horrors.” 8 Based on my meeting and conversation with Mitchell on the evening of June 19, I had thought he might well step forward and admit to his role in the break-in. But in the days and weeks that followed, after I learned what LaRue and Mardian had told him, I noticed Mitchell’s changed attitude. 9
Mitchell urged Ehrlichman to call L. Patrick “Pat” Gray, the acting director of the FBI, to get him to rein in the FBI’s investigation. He also enlisted Ehrlichman for assistance in devising an appropriate cover-up scenario.
When Haldeman stepped into the Oval Office at 9:30 A.M. he and the president conducted routine business until Nixon finally asked, “What’s the dope on the Watergate incident? Anything break on that since we talked last night?” 10
“No,” Haldeman said flatly. He explained that Watergate was off the table at the senior staff meeting, which was as he wanted it. Haldeman did, however, tell the president he had additional thoughts on the matter as a resultof his later discussion with Mitchell. “Mitchell’s concern is the FBI, the question of how far they’re going in the process. And he’s pretty concerned that that be turned off, and John’s [Ehrlichman] working on it.”
“My God, if you are talking to Gray, it’s got to be done by Ehrlichman,” the president insisted.
“Well, we were told yesterday in the discussion on this with Mitchell and Kleindienst that we should not go direct to the FBI. Mitchell said today that we’ve got to, and he asked Ehrlichman to talk to Gray. John’s doing it right now,” Haldeman explained. * He continued, “The question that Ehrlichman and I raised, both of us have been trying to think one step away from it and look at a strategy. See whether there’s something that we can do other than just sitting here and watching it drop on us bit by bit, as it goes along. And it’s pretty tough to think of anything. Ehrlichman laid out a scenario which would involve this guy Liddy, at the committee, confessing and taking the blame, moving the thing up to that level, with him saying, ‘Yeah, I did it, I did it; I hired these guys, sent them over there, because I thought it would be a good move and build me up in the operation; I’m a little guy, that nobody pays any attention to.’”
“Liddy? Who’s he? He the guy with the detective agency?” Nixon asked, confusing him with McCord.
“No. Liddy is the general counsel for the Re-Election Finance Committee. And he is the guy who did this.”
“Oooh,” the president groaned softly. This new fact prompted him to ask again if John Mitchell knew about the Watergate break-in before the arrests.
“Mitchell? I’m not really sure,” Haldeman replied, even more guarded than earlier. “He obviously knew something. I’m not sure how much. He clearly didn’t know any