Unthinkable by Kenneth M. Pollack Read Free Book Online Page A

in a matter of months (or possibly weeks), there is not even a theoretical danger that Iran would use one against Israel or Saudi Arabia or anyone else. By definition, it cannot do so until after it has broken out of the treaty and assembled the weapons, and that provides at least some time for the rest of the world to do something about it. Again, as long as the threat of sanctions, isolation, force, or other factors convinces Iran not to exercise its breakout option, that will continue to be the case. For those who worry that Iran would give nuclear weapons to terrorists, in this situation there are no weapons to give. There would be radioactive material that Iran might give to terrorists, but Tehran has had that capability for at least a decade and has never chosen to do so.
    If Iran has no deployed nuclear arsenal there should be no fear of an accidental launch or accidental detonation of one. Likewise, there is no danger of a bureaucratic or operational mistake—or someone exceeding orders or authority—during a nuclear alert in the midst of a nuclear crisis. Indeed, if Iran has never tested an actual weapon, it would probably be far more wary of getting into any situation in which it might feel the need to use one quickly for fear that the design will prove faulty.
    If Iran did not have the capacity to threaten with its nuclear arsenal—either directly or as the ultimate force behind its unconventional warfare operations—there would be even less reason to fear other Middle Eastern states bandwagoning with it. As we have seen with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, all of whom have breakout capabilities, a theoretical capacity to build a nuclear arsenal does not endow countries with the kind of awe, fear, and prestige that sway people’s thinking. Likewise, India’s standing before 1998 suggests that even a demonstrated capability to produceand detonate a nuclear weapon does not bring anything like the same political-psychological benefits as possession of an actual arsenal.
    The proliferation problem declines precipitously if Iran can be convinced not to weaponize. First, if Iran has only a theoretical capability and not a deployed arsenal, other countries will feel much less of a need to have their own arsenal. To the extent that they feel those pressures, they might only look to develop a theoretical capability. Japan’s development of a theoretical breakout capability did not goad anyone to do the same—although China’s actual arsenal spurred India’s program and India’s did the same for Pakistan (which got help from China). Moreover, the fact that Iran will have chosen not to cross that last threshold will help reinforce the disincentives that have kept other countries from doing so. If a regime as callous and willing to accept costs as Iran chose not to pay such a price, then why should other countries who value the prosperity of their citizens far more?
    If Iran were to stick with a breakout capability rather than fielding an actual arsenal, it would also tell us some important things about Tehran’s thinking. It would indicate that Iran’s goal was only to acquire the capability to deter attack on Iran itself, since that is all that such a breakout capability is good for. Yes, anyone can devise convoluted scenarios whereby the Iranians do things and sequence events in ways that allow them to surprise everyone with a weapon at the right moment, but in the real world such schemes are bureaucratically, operationally, and technically implausible. We would not know if that had always been Tehran’s aim, or they were convinced to fall back to such a minimal deterrent option by the pressure they faced, but we could assume that at that time, a minimal deterrent for homeland defense was all they wanted.
    Whatever Iranian intentions were when they first set out down the nuclear path, if they stop with a breakout capability it also suggests that something stopped