The Ka of Gifford Hillary by Dennis Wheatley Read Free Book Online

of the Korean type, or for despatch to dependencies such as Cyprus in which organised terrorist activities broke out. This meant that a high percentage of its present units would have to retain, more or less, the Old Look; but it must be accepted that there would be a reduction in the types of weapon and organisation with which this field force would be equipped. Even so, the retention of such a force would entail the expenditure of at least four hundred million annually, as the economy in heavy weapons and elimination of certain Reserve formations would be more than offset by the necessity of continuing to maintain the majority of the Old Look training establishments.
    With regard to Man-power, it was evident that all Arms required personnel with an ever greater degree of technical efficiency, and this could be achieved only by long-term service engagements. The aim should be for quality ratherthan quantity, and in this the benefits of National Service were dubious. It was therefore recommended that a reduction of intake should be offset by a really worthwhile increase in pay for all ranks as an inducement to increased enlistment of regulars who would make the Service a career.
    By the laying up of the majority of our war vessels, and the reduction of the Army’s heavy weapons, Reserve units, etc., it was estimated that we should save some three hundred and fifty million annually. This would enable us to pay for a greatly increased programme of nuclear weapon and aircraft production without placing a further burden on the taxpayer. But our object should be to reduce taxation if possible.
    Should the full implications of the New Look policy be accepted and put into practice by the British Government, it could be regarded as certain that our Continental Allies would shortly follow suit by laying up the bulk of their Navies and making similar economies in their Land Forces. This would enable them to make very considerable, savings in their Defence budgets; but, unlike ourselves, they could not transfer their savings to the increased production of weapons for a thermo-nuclear war, because the processes of manufacturing such weapons had not been divulged to them.
    That our Continental Allies should be placed in a position to relieve taxation while we could not do so would be manifestly unfair to the British people. It was therefore suggested that our Government should enter into discussion with the Governments of our Allies on the following lines, and, as an extension of the proposal, that the Minister of Defence should take over from the Service Chiefs the allocation of all funds voted for Defence purposes.
    Instead of the present system, by which each country votes a sum annually for the maintenance of its Navy, Army and Air Force, the whole allocation for its Defence should be placed at the disposal of a new committee to be set up at N.A.T.O. The committee would consist of the Defence Ministers of all the countries concerned, and they would decide in conference how the total defence budget of the Continental Allies should be expended.
    Thus, should Britain continue to be the only producer of thermo-nuclear weapons in Europe, she would no longer be automatically saddled with the whole of their cost. Such anarrangement would moreover lead to increased efficiency in the forces of the N.A.T.O. powers, as from it would emerge a far greater degree of uniformity in arms and equipment than existed at present. Lastly, if all our Continental Allies reduced their Sea and Land Forces on the same scale as was proposed for ourselves, all the countries concerned should be able to grant some relief from taxation to their peoples, yet still contribute to a central N.A.T.O. fund sums which would enable a much greater allocation to be made for the production of nuclear weapons than Britain alone could afford. Indeed, with the combined military budgets of the European Allies at its disposal, it would not be unreasonable to expect the N.A.T.O.