A History of Strategy by Martin van Creveld Read Free Book Online Page B

geography.”
    Having provided a survey of ancient and modern military writers as well as his own military experience, Puységur explains that “the foundation of the art of war is knowing how to form good
ordres de battaile
and how to make them move and operate according to the most perfect rules of movement, the principles of which are derived from geometry, with which all officers must be familiar.” Applying his own recipe step by step, he then illustrates the use of geometrical principles in order to find “the best method” for (
inter alia
) conducting marches, carrying out maneuvers in the face of the enemy, constructing camps, confronting an enemy who may have taken shelter behind lines, rivers, marshes, inundations, woods, and other obstacles, as well as foraging and passing convoys. Having done all this, he concludes with “the movements of two armies advancing upon each other,” only to break off his near-endless catalogue of “principles and rules” at precisely at the point where war, understood as an
interaction
of the two sides, begins.
    More famous than Puységur was Maurice, also known as the Marshal, de Saxe. A natural son of the Elector of Saxony, he became a professional soldier. Ultimately he was appointed commander in chief of the French Army during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). His
Reveries
(Dreams) were written in 1732, allegedly during thirteen feverish nights and with no other aim in mind except that of amusing himself. On one level the book is a reaction against Puységur. It starts by lamenting the absence of any reference to the “sublime” (i.e. non-mechanical) aspects of war in his predecessor’s work. On another it epitomizes eighteenth century warfare at its complex best, assuming as it does two comparatively small armies (at one point, following Montecuccoli, he says that 50,000 is the maximum that can be handled by any general) maneuvering against each other with the aim of fulfilling the sovereign’s orders to capture this province or that.
    This maneuvering was seen as the essence of war. Battle was to be engaged in only as a last resort; and then only when the prospects for victory appeared certain. There are separate chapters about field warfare, mountain warfare, siege warfare, and the problems of building field fortifications and dealing with them. Unlike many of his contemporaries, moreover, Saxe as a foreign nobleman without an independent fortune had worked his way up the chain of command almost from the bottom. Hence he also had many shrewd observations concerning the need to keep the soldiers’ clothing simple and the commander’s mind free of excessive detail, not to mention the danger of making generals out of colonels and thereby risking the possibility that they would be promoted one level above their natural ability.
    Generally, though, his most important contribution is considered to be the “legion.” Against the background of a period which still did not possess integrated formations comprising all arms—the largest unit was the regiment—he proposed the establishment of such formations. Each one was to number exactly 3,582 men. Each was to comprise, besides four infantry regiments, four troops of horse (one for each regiment), two twelve-pounder guns, a permanent headquarters, transport, engineers, and various supporting services. With that, the need to draw up a detailed
ordre de
battaile
, which Puységur had regarded as the very essence of the military art, for each occasion would be obviated. One would simply be able to name a “legion” and send it on this mission or that.
    Permanent formations would prove more cohesive than the rest and would be thus able to serve as “a kind of universal seminary of soldiers where different nations are freely adopted and their natural prejudices effectually removed.” In any event, the idea of building large, permanent, combined formations was destined to be adopted during the second half