Al-Qaeda by Jason Burke Read Free Book Online Page A

of millions of people in the Islamic world, housing and sanitation are grossly inadequate. Many cities are on their way to joining ‘failed states’ as locations of endemic anarchy, violence and alienation. 16 Everywhere, the gulf between rich and poor is increasing. And though Western European militants, particularly those from the third category outlined above, do not necessarily suffer physically, the new globalized Islamic identity, boosted by the new media and the events of recent years, means that the conditions in Gaza or in Iraq excite profound resentment in the UK or Germany too.
    But these problems alone do not cause terrorism. If individuals have faith in a political system, a belief that they can change their lives through activism that is sanctioned by the state, or understand and accept the reasons for their hardships they are unlikely to turn to militancy. But there is little reason to be optimistic about the possible development of alternatives that might divert the angry and alienated from radical Islam in the near future. Only in a few small Gulf states has there been any genuine move towards reform in recent years. In Saudi Arabia, though the worst of the radical preachers have been muzzled, religious collections at mosques stopped and the possibility of local elections raised, genuine political reform is still unlikely. The fundamental compact between the house of al-Saud and the Wahhabi ulema remains strong. Though a new king is making impressive efforts in Morocco, it does not look like there will be any genuinely significant reform in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Amman or the central Asia republics soon. One of the reasons for the evolution of more radical, debased and violent forms of protest is the tendency of governments in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world to repress moderate movements. Because they are scared of radical Islam taking power, such regimes block democratic reform. Because there is no reform, radical Islam grows in support. As national Islamic movements, moderate or violent, are crushed or fail, anger is channelled into the symbolic realm and into the international, cosmic language of bin Laden and his associates.
    And this is the biggest threat of all. This is the crucial third stage that turns an angry and frustrated young man into a terrorist. This isthe moment when an individual begins to conceive of doing something more than shouting slogans or waving banners. And it is here that the newly dominant, globalized ‘al-Qaeda’, defined as a universally transportable, universally applicable ideology and worldview, is so important. To overcome the behavioural norms that restrain most balanced citizens in any society from acts of appalling brutality, particularly against those usually considered civilians, a powerful legitimizing discourse is needed. The ideologues of modern jihadi Salafi Islamic radicalism with their vision of a cosmic struggle between good and evil, belief and unbelief, the true faith and its opponents, provide one. For those who feel angry and disempowered, radical Islam provides an answer. Didar, the Kurdish suicide bomber, spoke of how the lessons he received from his prayer leader at the mosque in Arbil helped him understand why ‘things were not right in the world’. Pakistani militants I interviewed in a prison in India in late 2003 told me of how accepting the radical Islamic worldview was like receiving a revelation. Suddenly, they said, they comprehended why all the ‘bad things that happened’. Radical Islam provides a remedy too. The militants I interviewed said that the ideology they had bought into meant they understood ‘what steps they should take’. 17 The real power of bin Laden’s discourse is that, like Marxism, it explains a personal experience by reference to a convincing general theory and then provides a programme of action that is comprehensible and convincing. And in explaining ‘injustice’ it justifies the most appalling