international events and new international identities. A clue as to the nature of the motivation of this new category of militant lies in the targets selected by the London bombers. It is significant that they did not strike at targets which represented political or military or even economic power, many of which remain relatively vulnerable. Instead they attacked the London tube at four particular points that represent best the extraordinary melting pot that the British capital has become in the twenty-first century: Aldgate East in the heart of the East End and in the middle of one of the country’s biggest Muslim populations; Edgware Road, where London’s Gulf Arab population is centred; Tavistock Square, one of the most cosmopolitan districts of the city with a huge shifting population of international students and tourists and King’s Cross, probably the most cosmopolitan place in one of the most cosmopolitan cities on earth. In this, their targets are representative of the success of integration, not the lack of it. Like the 17-year-old Pakistani youth I imagined above, the same fundamental questions about identity in a globalized world are being posed for such men, in a manner made more pressing than ever by the strategy pursued by both sides in the so-called ‘War on Terror’. Their answers are sometimes rejectionist, reactionary and profoundly violent. This theme will become clearer in the years that come. 13 These three groups are not rigidly defined and individual activists can show elements of all or neither. Men like bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Abu Qatada havemanaged, despite their own relatively prosperous backgrounds, to assume leadership of the most violent, ill-educated, inarticulate militant elements. But, despite the flaws inherent in any broad-brushed approach, this analysis may help us understand why terrorists act as they do.
Modern Islamic terrorists are made, not born. There are various stages in that process of creation. The route to terrorism starts with a feeling that something is wrong that needs to be set right. This can be a real problem or merely a perceived injustice (or indeed both). The second stage is the feeling that the problem, whether cosmic or purely personal, cannot be solved without recourse to a mode of action or activism beyond those provided for by a given society’s political or legal framework. The next stage changes the individual from being an activist, even a militant, into a terrorist. It involves the acceptance of an ideology and the development of a worldview that allows the powerful social barriers that stop most people from committing acts of violence to be overcome. It means that individuals feel compelled to do appalling things. This process is happening at an increasingly rapid rate with security services now aware of individuals becoming powerfully radicalized in weeks. If volunteers are to be diverted from terrorism it is this process that we need to counter.
The root causes of modern Islamic militancy are the myriad reasons for the grievances that are the first step on the road to terrorism. It is not a question of absolute deprivation but of how deprivation is perceived. Yet social and economic problems, though the link to terrorism is indirect, are critical as a pre-condition. Such problems are growing more, not less, widespread and profound throughout the Islamic world. The economies of nations from Morocco to Indonesia are in an appalling state. Population growth may now be slowing but more than half of all Pakistanis and Iranians are under 20 years old. Egypt’s population is still predicted to grow by a quarter between 2000 and 2015. Saudi Arabia’s is likely to rise by more than 50 per cent in the next ten years. 14 Unemployment, particularly among important groups such as graduates, is acute and real wages are stagnant. Growth in the Middle East during the 1990s has been under one per cent andhas barely picked up in real terms since. 15 For hundreds