grew to manhood, he was able to dilute the old guard so effectively as to make the former Imperial Army into an Army of the Third Reich after his own plan. This Army had more senior officers — generals and field marshals — than Germany had ever had before, and an even higher percentage of them came from the Nazi fold as the Third Reich progressed. Hitler was liberal with decorations — he awarded so many Iron Crosses that by 1944 almost one third of the Wehrmacht had been decorated — but equally he hired and fired his officers with no reference to Army administration, traditions, or to the General Staff. By then, though, the Army had no room to manoeuvre against the man who had made himself its absolute master.
As we shall see, the Army, with a few notable exceptions, did not possess a High Command that was very capable — either in terms of political astuteness or moral courage — of withstanding Hitler. Steeped in military tradition and often coming from families who had provided soldiers for centuries, they had a hidebound outlook, and, at best, even if their patriotism was not in doubt, even if they occasionally dared to question Hitler’s decisions on military matters, they could be self-serving. The Führer’s ability to suborn the top brass with bribes is an example of this, and it was a policy he continued with a high degree of success throughout his rule. Not all his generals were corrupt, many fought bravely — incredibly bravely — and well for their country, and some simply chose not to enter the political debate at all, restricting themselves to their soldierly duty. In this they were not unlike the majority of their countrymen, who allowed Hitler to succeed by not daring to protest; and in this they were no different from human beings under any dictatorship. But those in key positions at the outset — when Hitler could have been stopped most effectively — proved to have feet of clay.
The Minister of Defence from 1933 to 1938, succeeding to the post left vacant by Schleicher, was Colonel-General Werner von Blomberg. A man possessed of Wagnerian good looks, though not of mighty intellect, his courage was undisputed; but his record as Hitler’s War Minister (as he was called officially from 1935) was such as to earn him the nickname of ‘Rubber Lion’. Blomberg’s chief fault was to believe that Hitler would restore to the Army all its former power and glory. Once he had given his loyalty to Hitler, he was able, by virtue of his position, to block any influence the anti-Nazi Kurt von Hammerstein had enjoyed through his friend. Hammerstein resigned at the end of 1933 and was followed by Blomberg’s appointee, Colonel-General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, who assumed his duties February 1934.
Fritsch was a Prussian nobleman and came from a military family. He had kept his hands clean of National Socialism, but he had not criticised it either. For the present, everyone felt safe with him as Commander-in-Chief. For Hitler, he was an improvement on the unsympathetic Hammerstein, and Hitler still had to move cautiously in his plans to take over control of the Army. Fritsch was not devious, nor was he interested in politics. He would carry out his orders unquestioningly. Those on the Right who opposed Hitler (the National Conservatives and the Schleicher faction) felt that at least Fritsch was not a Nazi either, and could be ‘turned’ if the moment to overthrow Hitler presented itself.
Von Schleicher had not been idle since Hitler had taken over the reins of power, and gathered about him was a small number of generals prepared to move their troops against the SA, arrest Hitler and have Hindenburg declare a state of emergency. The excuse for this was the coup anticipated from the SA in view of the mounting tension between them and the Army. This tension had been growing throughout 1933 and had reached snapping point by the late spring of 1934, when the power of the SA was alarming the most