Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country by Andrew J. Bacevich Read Free Book Online

large youth demographic bulge and insufficient economic opportunity, and the social construct between governments and their people breaking down in numerous places.” Making matters worse, Mattis conceded that “the lack of a sustainable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a preeminent flame that keeps the pot boiling in the Middle East.” Expressing regret that 612 U.S. troops had been killed under his command, along with another 8,251 wounded, he consoled himself with the thought that combat was producing “a generation of elite leaders,” without, however, venturing to say what exactly such sacrifices had accomplished. Still, the general had no doubt that “persistent military engagement” would enable CENTCOM “to protect vital interests, prevent future conflict, ensure access in the event of a crisis and invest in future regional security.” The key to success lay in trying harder, sending more U.S. troops on more missions to more places. For General Mattis, light eternally glimmered at the end of CENTCOM’s tunnel.
    AFRICOM, created in 2007 and encompassing fifty-four countries, emphasizes a similar can-do spirit. According to a “Failed States Index” cited by General Carter Ham, in his 2012 commander’s “Posture Statement,” Africa is home to fourteen of the world’s twenty weakest states. Governments across the continent “lack the capacity or political will to effectively address demographic, political, social, and economic challenges, including population growth, rapid urbanization, persistent internal conflicts, widening income inequality, burgeoning political demands, widespread disease, and increasing demands for essential resources.” But General Ham, like General Mattis, professed optimism. “Through sustained engagement,” AFRICOM was going “to create a security environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued development.” 12
    From the general’s lips to God’s ears, one might respond. In the face of such grandiose statements, a cynic might suggest that engagement is a euphemism, properly translated as “preparing for war”—extended reconnaissance operations during which U.S. forces familiarize themselves with trouble spots that may someday become the site of shoot-to-kill “contingency operations.” A cynic might also note that when engagement produces results other than those promised, the Pentagon’s reflexive response is not to rethink the enterprise but to subdivide the world further. Thus do new commands proliferate, providing employment for more generals and admirals managing more engagement programs, while back home the Pentagon creates offices to provide oversight and support. Small wonder that “the Pentagon” has long since outgrown the Pentagon.
    In the years ahead, unless the Greater Middle East suddenly becomes a garden of peace and goodwill, we can no doubt look forward to AFRICOM dividing into northern (mostly Muslim) and southern (mostly not) components, with CENTCOM splitting into a Near East Command (centered on the Persian Gulf) and a Southwest Asia Command (centered on the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan). What we cannot look forward to is anyone questioning the sense of the basic endeavor. In its quest to control an unruly world, the Pentagon—acting in the name of the American people—slices and dices that world into smaller and smaller segments, while neglecting to assess the actual costs and benefits of the persistent meddling that it terms engagement. In this way, the regionalization of U.S. military policy serves to perpetuate sterile thinking.
    OPERATIONAL PURPOSE: MIMICKING ISRAEL
    Peace means different things to different governments and different countries. To some it suggests harmony based on tolerance and mutual respect. To others it serves as a euphemism for dominance , quiescence defining the relationship between the strong and the supine.
    In the absence of actually existing peace, a