Brothers in Arms by Odd Arne Westad Read Free Book Online Page A

the Soviet references to Xinjiang and Manchuria, Chinese provinces under CCP control. With his unflinchable ability to push wrong buttons in such talks, Stalin at one point asked Mao whether Moscow from now on should sign separate trade agreements with these areas, thereby forcing on the Chinese leader images of Soviet control of the Chinese periphery. There are no doubts that Mao had problems accepting the secret additional agreement that, among other privileges for Moscow, excluded all non-Soviet foreign citizens from the three Manchurian provinces and from Xinjiang, even though he appreciated Soviet willingness to transfer some of the Manchurian railways and to phase out the Soviet military presence on Liaodong. 35
Mao hoped to discuss a fairly full foreign policy agenda with Stalin, with the problem of "uniting the revolutionary forces of the East" on top of the list. But even before the Chinese leader set out for Moscow, Stalin had made known that he did not want to consider regional problems. Because of Soviet resistance, the CCP had had to shelve its plans to send Chinese troops to fight alongside the Vi-

     

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etminh against the French in Vietnam. Korea, Mao's second priority in terms of foreign relations, was not on the agenda in any of the official talks in Moscow. On relations with the United States, Stalin recommended a moderate policy, even on the issue of Taiwan. "What is most important here is not to give the Americans a pretext to intervene," Stalin told Mao. He rejected Mao's request for Soviet "volunteer pilots or secret military detachments to speed up the conquest of Formosa" and suggested that an internal uprising would be the best way to liberate the island.
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The summit ended in a mixed result for the Chinese visitors. They did get aid and security guarantees. They did get Soviet promises to restore formal Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. They did not get Mongolia, aid to conquer Taiwan, or a joint revolutionary strategy for East Asia. Worse, the Soviet side consistently forced the Chinese into the role of supplicants, and Stalin, especially, missed no opportunity to lord over his visitors. For those in the Chinese delegation who had not experienced Stalin's Russia firsthand, it was a rude reminder of the inequalities of Soviet socialism. For all the CCP leaders, embarked on a mission of national resurrection through socialist transformation, there were only two ways out of the dilemmas the Soviet slights posed: to prove one's worth as a loyal junior ally, or to stand up for recognition as an equal. The next two stages of Sino-Soviet relations were shaped by these mind-sets. 37
War, 1950-1953
The Korean War provided the content for the Sino-Soviet relationship that the Moscow summit had failed to produce. Fighting the war gave the new Chinese regime a chance to stand up against imperialism and fitted Mao's sense of purpose as a regional liberator. The war linked the military establishments of the countries in a common task, in spite of frequent disagreements on how to conduct the campaigns. Through their efforts in Korea, the CCP leaders could prove themselves worthy of a prominent role in the world Communist movement. For Stalin the war became a surrogate for the all-out war with the West that he neither wanted nor was prepared for, a containable war in which he, through the Chinese war effort, could hit back at the United States for past setbacks in Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. 38
It is unlikely, however, that this was a war which Mao or Stalin really wanted in the first place. Mao was ready to confront imperialism outside China's borders, but Korea was not his arena of choice. As he explained to his colleagues during the long and tortuous debate in Beijing in the fall of 1950 on whether China should intervene, Korea was right next to China's most important industrial areas and close to the center of the PRC government. 39

     

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North Korean leader Kim Il Sung