Brothers in Arms by Odd Arne Westad Read Free Book Online

CCP and the Soviet Communist Party, the CCP, having outlined its point of view, will submit and will resolutely carry out the decisions of the Soviet Communist Party.
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Avoiding all of Stalin's traps, Liu pushed through his agenda on military and economic aid to the CCP regime. In his efforts, Liu may have been helped by a growing sense in the upper echelons of Soviet bureaucracy in military affairs as well as foreign policy that a Communist China would be a valuable ally of the Soviet Union. 28 Even though Stalin himself insisted officially on treating the visiting CCP leaders as a trade delegation from Manchuria, in his first meeting with Liu he already made clear that he would provide direct support for "an all-China democratic coalition government" as soon as it was set up. 29
Mao and his colleagues still could not be certain of the Soviet reaction as they formulated their plans for establishing their own government and their own state in late September 1949. Even though the Soviets had been pressing for a separate CCP government since January, Mao knew how difficult it was and had been for the East European Communist regimes to fit into Moscow's plans. 30 His new state had to conform to the Soviet worldview in terms of its domestic policies and, even more important, its international posture. There seem to have been numerous exchanges between Moscow and Beijing on the basic policies and organization of the new state between the end of Liu's visit in mid-August and October 1. At his very first meeting with the Soviet ambassador, General Nikolai Roshchin, on October 16, Mao still felt the need to use most of the time to condemn Yugoslav perfidy. Mao thought it vital that Moscow see that China's orientation was written in stone. 31
The ultimate step up the ladder in the Chinese leader's search for Stalin's recognition was a face-to-face meeting in Moscow. After the People's Republic had been set up, Mao's inner-party prestige could no longer suffer snubs by the "boss" as a "disciple of Stalin," Mao had to secure a rendezvous with his teacher. After having made Mao's intention plain to Roshchin, it still took sub-

     

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stantial Chinese pressure and Zhou Enlai's diplomatic skills to arrange for Mao's train finally to depart for Moscow on December 6.
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Until recently our view of the Moscow summit the only meeting between the two Communist autocrats has been like a poorly made home movie: We see shadows moving about, we see people we think we identify doing things we think we recognize and comprehend, but it is all blurred, out of focus. The refocusing made possible by the Russian archives enables us to start pondering the significance of the meeting. What we can conjecture is the following: 33
Mao's main priority was establishing a new relationship between the two countries. He wanted a treaty that validated his regime as a socialist government, regulated Soviet policy toward the Chinese border areas, and provided Moscow's support for China's development and national security. After much tergiversation on Stalin's part, Mao got most of what he wanted in terms of a formal alliance as well as economic aid and military assistance. The final treaties promised China Soviet military assistance in case of "aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression"implicitly providing Beijing with protection in case of a conflict with the United States. In addition, the Soviet Union would supply China with credits of around $300 million and expand the programs of military aid in essential areas such as the construction of a PRC air force and development of long-range artillery. 34
Other bilateral issues fared much worse in the Chinese view. Mongolia was a main concern for Mao, who initially had hoped to unite the Mongolian People's Republic with (Chinese) Inner Mongolia as a part of New China. The Soviets would have nothing of it. Even worse for Beijing were