Closing the Ring by Winston S. Churchill Read Free Book Online Page B

affronted when his new military chief proposed the immediate withdrawal of the Italian divisions from the Balkans. He regarded these forces as the counterpoise to German predominance in Europe. He did not realise that defeats abroad and internal demoralisation had robbed him of his status as Hitler’s ally. He cherished the illusion of power and consequence when the reality had gone. Thus he resisted Ambrosio’s formidable request. So durable however was the impression of his authority and the fear of his personal action in extremity that there was prolonged hesitation throughout all the forces of Italian society about how to oust him. Who would “bell the cat”? Thus the spring had passed, with invasion by a mighty foe, possessing superior power by land, sea, and air, drawing ever nearer.
    During July the climax came. Since February the taciturn, cautious-minded, constitutional King had been in contact with Marshal Badoglio, who had been dismissed after the Greek disasters in 1940. He found in him at length a figure to whom he might entrust the conduct of the state. A definite plan was made. It was resolved that Mussolini should be arrested on July 26, and General Ambrosio agreed to find the agents and create the situation for this stroke. The General was aided unwittingly by elements in the Fascist Old Guard, who sought a new revival of the Party, by which, in many cases, they would not be the losers. They saw in the summoning of the highest Party organ, the Fascist Grand Council, which had not met since 1939, the means of confronting the Duce with an ultimatum. On July 13, they called on Mussolini and induced him to convene a formal session of the Council on July 24.The two movements appear to have been separate and independent, but their close coincidence in date is significant.
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    We had at the time no definite knowledge of the inner stresses of Italian politics, but reports of growing demoralisation and unrest had for some time reached Allied Headquarters. Strikes and rioting in the Northern Italian cities had followed on our bombing raids. We knew that the food situation in Italy had worsened as rail traffic was disrupted. It seemed that the time had come to launch an appeal to the Italian people upon the Sicily landing. President Roosevelt had proposed a proclamation which seemed to us to assume for the United States a position which was not fair to the British share in the Italian war. On July 5 I cabled him as follows:
    Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
    5 July 43
    The War Cabinet had contemplated a joint declaration to the Italian people in the name of both our countries. Whereas “Torch” was by agreement planned as an American expedition with a British contingent and I have acted as your lieutenant throughout, we consider “Husky” [Sicily] and post-“Husky” as joint undertakings in which we are equal partners. This would certainly seem justified by the proportion of troops, naval forces, shipping, and aircraft involved. I fully accept your dictum that “there should be no senior partner.”
    2. However, since we have been longer in quarrel or war with Italy than you, and also since a document of this character written by one man in its integrity is better than a joint production, we are ready that you should speak at this juncture to the Italian people on behalf of both our countries and in the interests of the common cause.
    3. There are a few amendments which I venture to suggest to you in all the frankness of our friendship. They are of importance, because without them untoward reactions might grow among the British people and their forces that their contribution had not received equal or sufficient recognition. In fact, they are only mentioned once, and all else is either United States or United Nations.
    4. The amendments are as follows: ( a ) After the words, “against whom on December 11, 1941, your Government declared war,” insert, “I speak also on behalf