affluent world, growing their presence
across developed countries and then across the developing world. Their success has
come largely from an export-driven approach in which they targeted the affluent in
every country and replicated their products, business models, and management systems
and practices across countries. However, this model of skimming the top has limits.
It is less successful in reaching the next billion emerging middle-class customers
who are far less affluent and who live in countries that, like India, have poor infrastructure,
skill shortages, rampant corruption, and very high volatility and uncertainty.
Cracking this segment requires a new model of globalization that is radically, not
incrementally, different. In a prescient article in Harvard Business Review , the late C. K. Prahalad wrote:
When large Western companies rushed to enter emerging markets 20 years ago, they were
guided by a narrow and often arrogant perspective. They tended to see countries like
China and India simply as targets—vast agglomerations of would-be consumers hungry
for modern goods and services. This “corporate imperialism” has distorted the operating,
marketing, and distribution decisions multinationals have made in serving developing
countries. In particular, these companies have tended to gear their products and pitches
to small segments of relatively affluent buyers—those who, not surprisingly, most
resemble the prototypical Western consumer. They have missed, as a result, the very
real opportunity to reach much larger markets further down the socioeconomic pyramid.
Succeeding in these broader markets requires companies to spend time building a deep
and unbiased understanding of the unique characteristics and needs of developing countries
and their peoples. But such time is well spent. Not only will it unlock new sources
of revenue, it will also force big companies to innovate in ways that will benefit
their operations throughout the world. 7
However, the mind-set and behavior change that Prahalad refers to is a paradigm shift,
which is, by definition, destabilizing and threatening. Think about the implications
of the new model. The dominant hub-and-spoke architecture of a company with an all-knowing,
all-powerful headquarters instructing and supervising the geographical subsidiaries
gives way to a new architecture of multiple hubs, including China and India, that
is run as real profit-and-loss businesses with significant operating freedom. Innovation
happens not just in product divisions and at headquarters but in geographic areas,
too. Executive leaders don’t just live at headquarters; many operate out of hubs.
The company has to cut investments in the rich, slowing markets of Europe and in product
divisions or strategic business units in order to fund investments in key emerging
markets. It also has to have the patience and tenacity to wait for these investments
to pay back. It has to prioritize markets, not on the basis of revenues but on opportunity.
This requires new capabilities, such as the ability to operate in places that are
corrupt, volatile, and uncertain. The company has to behave with humility, responsibility,
and open-mindedness in all countries. Poor safety and environmental practices, monopolistic
pricing, and the dumping of obsolete or banned products in emerging markets won’t
go unchallenged.
No wonder it’s easier to be an ostrich and simply execute the old model better.
Companies often tread cautiously and reluctantly in markets like India. The reluctance
could prove costly. Many industry leaders could be replaced by smaller competitors
or newer players from emerging markets that embrace the next wave of globalization
faster. Paradigm shifts invariably reorder leadership; incumbent leaders are slower
to adapt than hungry underdogs or new players. Just think of how Apple, Google, and
Samsung have devastated