Exit the Colonel by Ethan Chorin Read Free Book Online Page A

Italy’s ENI. 25 The assumption appears to have been that bribes for oil contracts had been embedded in deals with Libya’s principal sovereign wealth fund, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). 26
    While US oil companies undoubtedly used Libyan deals to boost booked reserves and shareholder dividends, the companies en masse were also an instrument of US foreign policy. By securing substantial rights to current and future Libyan oil, the companies were enacting the US government’s post-9/11 strategy of diversifying the sources of Middle Eastern oil. 27 It looked like a good bet at the time, for the companies were in the market for new sources and sufficiently believed in the Libyan reform narrative that they were willing to pay big money. Within a short time, however, many (those whose compensation structure was longer term) were starting to ask themselves if this had really been such a wise idea.

Honeymoon’s Over, 2005–2006
    For American diplomats, oil companies, and sundry others interested in the Libyan experiment, the first year back in Libya had been interesting, exhilarating, and exhausting—but largely hopeful. By the second year, the novelty had started to wear off, as both sides felt they were somehow not quite getting what they had bargained for.
    Despite the fact that the USLO was still operating in a self-styled five-star hotel, conditions had become psychologically grueling. Embassy personnel were under constant surveillance. Hotel quarters, while well
appointed, were cramped, often unbearably hot, and almost hermetically sealed. A joke within the group was that Libya was “Iraq, but without the shooting—for now.” The combination of living conditions, “unaccompanied” status (no family members), difficulties in persuading the Libyan government to act on issues critical to moving the relationship forward, and mixed messages from a Washington completely preoccupied with the deteriorating situation in Iraq contributed to a sense of almost perpetual crisis. As a result, USLO gained a reputation within the department as dysfunctional. Key reporting and administrative positions remained unfilled from 2004 through most of 2005.
    Of approximately two hundred forty diplomatic posts, the USLO’s was rumored to be one with the highest curtailment (dropout or transfer) rate during these years. When questioned, a senior State Department official later said, “Frankly, I was not aware of this. All I can say is that we had our hands full, and while it took a bit of time, we ultimately got better resources out there.” 28 The dropout rate, the criticism of Libya by those who left and came back and those who were managing them, and the unaccompanied status made it very difficult to induce anyone with significant Arabic skills to volunteer for Libya, other than on a temporary basis. Further, as the department was exerting stronger pressure on those with Arabic skills to serve in Iraq (many had initially refused on principle), many made the calculation that if an Iraq tour was going to be a condition for advancement within the Near East Bureau, they might as well bite the bullet, as a Libya tour would not count nearly as much when it was time for promotions. Thus, what one would have expected to have been, and in many ways was, one of the most exciting posts in the Near East Bureau, became a pariah post. Even those with serious competencies and the willingness to take risks were so overwhelmed with the magnitude of logistical problems, and complications to their personal life caused by Libya’s “unaccompanied” status, that they quickly burned out.
    During the first year, “diplomatic notes” (the formal diplomatic process for requesting and approving action) worked reasonably well. Western requests for information and action on a range of issues, even if not satisfied immediately, generated positive responses and some display of willingness to