Exit the Colonel by Ethan Chorin Read Free Book Online Page B

engage. A year later, many of the requests went unanswered, and Gaddafi’s men made it clear that certain lines should not be crossed (with respect to human rights investigations and so on), and they reduced access to key ministers. Diplomats’ occasional efforts to investigate conditions at Tripoli
prisons were met with stern warnings from the Libyan side and threats to make the inquiring officers persona non grata. One member of the team, frustrated with the narrow range of subjects on which he was authorized to report, penned a brilliant three-part essay on the socioeconomic milieu of Moroccan prostitutes in Libya. These cables, entitled “To the Whores of Tripoli,” were squelched by the clearing officer, and thus never made it to Wikileaks.
    In the middle of 2005, much of the diplomatic community—the US’s in particular—found that some of the Libyan government’s early receptiveness (if not action) to requests for assistance on both high-level and more mundane administrative issues had been compromised, and that the Libyans were increasingly irritated with what they felt was an unwillingness on the West’s part to recognize the “great sacrifices” Gaddafi had made in 2003.
    Feeling ever unappreciated, Gaddafi began to chafe. “The more we give, the slower things go,” became the Libyan mantra. Officials began responding to perceived (and in some cases, real) slights by imposing quasi-reciprocal penalties on US diplomats and businesspeople. At a time when Libya was ostensibly trying to recreate its image to the West, well-heeled American adventure travelers on international cruises found themselves denied permission to set foot on Libyan soil. Visa restrictions continued to prevent the US from fully staffing the USLO, and often caused some of the larger American oil companies to operate locally using skeleton staffs.
    Interestingly, the second EPSA IV auction round, for which twenty-six areas were on offer, resulted in a sweep, not for the Americans, but for the European and Russian firms and the Asian companies like Nippon and Japex. In the third round, covering fourteen areas, the Russians (Gazprom), Canadians, and Germans won exploration rights. ExxonMobil was the lone American company to pick up new real estate. The results likely reflected a message to the Americans from the Libyans that progress in the Libya-US relationship was not going as fast or as deep as Gaddafi wanted or expected. The results also showed the increasing feeling within the industry that Libyan terms (production-sharing demands and expectations of high signing bonuses, and subsequent demands for the incorporation of Libyan nationals in senior positions) were too harsh, given expected returns.
    In early 2005, the foreign oil companies began holding collective monthly “awareness meetings” in which to discuss impediments to business that were not specific to any one company. Visas were always at the top of the list. Other issues included more or less incessant demands from the
Libyan government, via Matouk al Matouk, the Libyan minister of labor, for increased quotas in the hiring of Libyan nationals (the vast majority of whom were wholly unqualified). Several companies reported receiving lists of people they should hire directly from Matouk’s office.
    Frequent changes to tax and investment law as it applied to the oil industry activities were also issues, as were security around oilfields and transport logistics. (Saif Al Islam, for example, at one point canceled all the foreign oil companies’ original aviation service contracts and required a Libyan company, whose equipment was not up to international safety standards, to provide service.)
    Another issue was the Arab League boycott of Israel. According to a law passed by the US Congress in 1977, US companies would be fined for any collaboration with countries that implemented the boycott. While there was no blanket