Hellcats by Peter Sasgen Read Free Book Online

The problem with it was that ICPOA had little in the way of solid intelligence regarding the size and density of the minefields sown in the strait and its approaches. To further complicate matters the Tsushima Strait had a unique hydrographic feature known as the Kuroshio Current, the Japan Current, sometimes called the Black Stream for its deep blue color.
    A branch of the equatorial current of the Pacific Ocean, the Kuroshio flows northeastward at a speed of approximately three knots along the coast of Formosa to Japan and thence into the Sea of Japan. The current continues northward until it reaches La Pérouse Strait, where it flows out into the Sea of Okhotsk. Voge pondered what hydrodynamic effect the inflowing or outflowing Kuroshio Current might have on a submerged submarine moving through the straits. Would it slow or speed up its passage?
    The biggest drawback Voge saw to using the Tsushima Strait to enter the Sea of Japan was its minefields. Lockwood agreed. He believed that they posed a virtually impregnable barrier to penetration by submarines, surfaced or submerged, never mind the presence of antisubmarine air and surface patrols. Faced with having to penetrate an uncharted mine barrier, he and Voge focused instead on La Pérouse Strait. Intelligence reports indicated that it had a safe, unmined channel that the Japanese allowed neutral Soviet surface ships to use when sailing between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Russian naval base at Vladivostok on the Siberian coast. Intelligence indicated that the Japanese had sown mines in the La Pérouse channel at various depths between forty feet and seventy feet. This allowed Russian merchant ships—Japanese, too—to make safe passage, as very few ships in the world other than warships drew more than thirty-five feet of water. The mines, then, posed a danger only to submerged submarines, not surfaced ones.
    Intelligence regarding the La Pérouse mine plants had been gleaned from various sources, including Japanese sailors picked up at sea from ships that had been sunk by subs operating close to Japan; from notices to mariners in the form of published bulletins distributed by the Japanese to local shippers, warning them of mined waters to be avoided; and from decrypted enemy radio broadcasts containing similar information transmitted to Japanese ships in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan. ICPOA had also picked up a few sketchy reports from spies who had made contact with Russian seamen familiar with La Pérouse Strait. Lockwood reasoned that if Russian ships could transit the strait via the safe channel, then so might surfaced American submarines. He also reasoned that even if a sub skipper didn’t know exactly where the channel was he could always trail a Russian ship whose master knew what course to steer.
    After sifting through these reports and weighing the pros and cons, Lockwood and Voge came to the same conclusion: It was high time that U.S. subs poked their bows into the Sea of Japan.
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    As Lockwood’s plan to get subs into the Sea of Japan began to jell, he took time out to undertake the West Coast inspection tour Admiral English’s death had left unaccomplished. From Pearl Harbor Lockwood flew to Dutch Harbor, Alaska, then to San Francisco, ending his tour in San Diego. The submarine-repair facilities he toured were not as well equipped nor as efficient as Lockwood had hoped for. A lack of facilities and especially of trained civilian personnel hampered efforts to repair submarines and return them to the combat zone as fast as possible. Lockwood realized that it would take a special task force dedicated to the job of revamping the facilities and speeding up the workflow to accomplish what was needed.
    While in San Diego Lockwood received an invitation from Dr. Gaylord P. Harnwell, director of the University of California Division of War Research (UCDWR), to visit the facilities Harnwell directed at the U.S. Navy Radio and