Henry V: The Background, Strategies, Tactics and Battlefield Experiences of the Greatest Commanders of History Paperback by Marcus Cowper Read Free Book Online Page B

Blaumont,
    Salines Grand-pre and Roussy, the rearguard under the Counts of Dammartin
    and Fauquembergue, while the forces on the flanks were led by the Count of
    Vendome and Clignet de Brebant. This complexity of the command structure
    led to French commentators blaming it for the defeat that followed, as
    described by the anonymous monk of Saint-Denis:

    In the absence of the king of France and the dukes of Guienne, Brittany and
    Burgundy, the other princes had taken charge of the conduct of the war. There is
    no doubt that they would have brought it to a happy conclusion if they had not
    shown so much disdain for the small number of the enemy and if they had not
    engaged in the battle so impetuously, despite the advice of knights who were
    worth listening to because of their age and experience... When it came to putting
    the army into battle formation (as is always the usage before coming to blows)
    each of the leaders claimed for himself the honour of leading the vanguard. This
    led to considerable debate and so that there could be some agreement, they came
    to the rather unfortunate conclusion that they should all place themselves in the
    front line.
    With the armies arranged, both sides stayed in their positions - the French
    between the villages of Agincourt and Tramecourt while the English line of
    battle was situated just outside of their camp at Maisoncelle. When it came
    to a stand off, however, the English had much more to lose and Henry
    decided to advance his men towards the French line, moving from around
    1,000m (3,280ft) away to within around 300m (1,000ft), as the St Albans
    Chronicle written by Thomas Walsingham relates:
    Because of the muddiness of the place, however, the French did not wish to
    proceed too far into the field. They waited about to see what our men, whom
    This view of the Agincourt
    they held cheap, intended to do. Between each of the two armies the field lay,
    battlefield is taken from
    scarcely 1,000 paces in extent... Because the French were holding their position
    the Agincourt-Tramecourt
    without moving it was necessary for the English, if they wished to come to grips
    road looking towards
    with the enemy, to traverse the middle ground on foot, burdened with their arms.
    the English camp at
    Maisoncelle. It is over
    Somewhat surprisingly, this advance appears to have been largely uncontested this ground that the
    by the French, and the English were able to take up their second position English army advanced
    unmolested, which put them within range of bowshot of the French line and to take up their second
    also gave them thick woods to both protect the archers on the flanks and position and launch
    narrow the frontage available for any French advance.
    the missile attack that
    Once they had taken up this new position, Sir Thomas Erpingham, steward would start the battle.
    of the Royal household and one of the most experienced officers in Henry's (Author's collection)
    army, gave the archers the order to fire
    and the 5,000 men, positioned on
    both flanks, complied. This appears to
    have provoked the French cavalry into
    launching a charge at the archers'
    positions. However, a combination of
    the heavy going over ploughed fields,
    the incessant arrow fire and the fact
    they couldn't get round the flanks of
    the archers because of the woods
    meant that the French cavalry were
    driven back. The charge was also not
    31

    A 15th-century illustration
    of the battle
    of Agincourt from the
    StAtbans Chronide (Ms 6
    f.243). This chronicle
    was written by the mon k
    Thomas Walsingham and
    it contains an accurate,
    if somewhat thin, account
    of the battle.
    (© Lambeth Palace
    Library, London, UK/The
    Bridgeman Art Library)
    helped by the fact that only a small proportion of the 2,400 cavalry on the
    flanks actually participated in it, less than 500, so there was no weight behind
    the move. The chronicler Jean Juvenal des Ursins describes what happened to
    the charge:
    The French were heavily armed