community’s broader values, should result in a collective response to defend them. Although alliances entail similar commitments, collective security organizations differ by not being constituted against pre-identified enemies or threats and are therefore inherently more ambitious. The reason the UN falls short of the ideal is because some of its commitments to collective security remain voluntary. For example, while the UN is empowered to deploy various peaceful approaches to conflict resolution, and while under Chapter VII of the Charter the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can authorize member states to use force in collective self-defence and to uphold international peace and security, member states are not obligated to carry out such resolutions.
Similarly, while one of the UN’s strengths is that its membership of 193 states is almost universal, with this enhancing its legitimacy, it is also clear that the security concerns of thepermanent members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA—the P5 who comprised the victorious powers after the Second World War) take precedence over those of others. The UNSC also needs to be distinguished from the UN General Assembly (where all countries are represented and where the principle of sovereign equality, of one member one vote, holds sway) and the Secretariat (the bureaucratic arm of the UN headed by the Secretary-General—currently Ban Ki-moon). Under the UN Charter the Security Council was accorded primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. To do this it can establish various types of peace operations, invoke sanctions, and even authorize military action. Alongside the P5 the UNSC includes a rotating group of ten non-permanent members. However, the P5’s permanent status and their unique right to unilaterally veto resolutions made in the Security Council ultimately provides them with a privileged role in identifying, framing, and responding to key international security concerns.
In 1945, the granting of this privileged status to what were then the world’s most powerful states was necessary to secure their commitment to the new organization and to avoid one of the failings of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations. One consequence, however, has been that in the context of the emergence of revived and new powers like Germany, Japan, and India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and Nigeria, and the declining power of the UK and France, the composition of the P5 seems increasingly anachronistic. More particularly, however, throughout the Cold War the P5’s privileged status also undermined the UN’s ability to play a significant role in many key issues of international peace and security, due to the difficulty the P5 often had in reaching agreements across the Cold War divide. As such, both the USA and Soviet Union deployed their veto power to prevent the UN taking action in various conflicts with an East–West dimension to them. Indicative of the situation was the UNSC resolution in June 1950 sanctioning military action against North Korea following its invasion of South Korea, an action thatwas only possible because the Soviet Union was at that time boycotting the UNSC in protest at the continued occupation of the Chinese seat on the Council by the nationalist government based in Taiwan. The Soviet Union argued that the rightful occupant of this seat was the newly created People’s Republic of China. Moscow would not make this mistake again.
Importantly, the UN’s founding in the wake of the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War context also impacted on its understanding of the content of international peace and security, which in the Charter is primarily connected to limiting the use of force between states. The Charter therefore endorsed state sovereignty—the right of states to organize their internal affairs as they wish—as a core principle of the international system. As such, the Charter