JFK by Oliver Stone, L. Fletcher Prouty Read Free Book Online

cover” story that has been created since the failure of the Brigade is incorrect.
    President Kennedy reacted quickly and deftly, as soon as the Brigade was forced to surrender. He formed a Cuban Study Group one day after the Brigade’s defeat and charged it with the responsibility of determining the cause for the failure of that operation he had inherited from the previous administration. That prestigious and diverse study group consisting of Allen Dulles, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Adm. Arleigh Burke, and Robert Kennedy, reported that Bundy’s telephone call to General Cabell that cancelled the President’s air strike order was the primary reason for the failure on the beach and the surrender of the Cuban Exile Brigade.
    The language of the report, as written by General Taylor and unanimously agreed to by the group, was used almost verbatim by the president when he issued National Security Action Memorandum, #55, June 28, 1961, which began the process of changing the responsibility “for the defense of the nation in the Cold War similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities” from the CIA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When fully implemented, as Kennedy had planned, after his reelection in 1964, it would have taken the CIA out of the covert operations business. This proved to be one of the first nails in John F. Kennedy’s coffin.
    By mid-1963 Kennedy had arrived at the brink of a decision to keep all American troops out of Vietnam and to withdraw “all U.S. personnel”—military, CIA, and others—“from Vietnam by the end of 1965.” Anyone interested in the exact coverage of the steps in this policy making should read the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961—1963 , vol. IV, “Vietnam: August—December 1963” by the Department of State and published by the U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. This official record documents twenty-six highest level meetings in the White House with President Kennedy during the period August 28, 1963, to November 13, 1963. At the same time, my immediate superior officer, Maj. Gen. Victor H. Krulak attended twenty-three of those meetings in addition to making a quick visit to South Vietnam. Such a full schedule, in the White House and with the President among other high officials, in such a concentrated period is most unusual. It shows clearly how closely Kennedy made an analysis of the Vietnam situation his own problem, and it relates precisely the ideas he brought to the attention of his key staff on the subject.
    It is significant to note that as General Krulak came and went from the White House during that busy period, including his quick trip to and from Vietnam, he would call several of us on his staff into his office each day, discuss the notes he had made, and give us instructions concerning what he wanted done for the next day’s meeting with Kennedy. Quite naturally, I was intimately aware of this planning process, its policies, and precisely what the President intended as Vietnam policy for 1964 and 1965.
    The president considered it imperative for Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to visit Vietnam during that troubled time one month before the Diems were to be removed from Saigon to Europe in accordance with his approved plan. At the same, General Krulak was made responsible for producing the final document for President Kennedy that would be known as the McNamara—Taylor Trip Report, October 2, 1963.
    It was carefully written by several of us in the Pentagon under General Krulak’s guidance, utilizing the notes and personal comments of the President. Charts and photos were added, as necessary, and it was bound in leather. It was not something produced by the two principals during their busy travels. When completed and approved, Krulak arranged for a jet fighter aircraft to rush it to Hawaii where it was given to the travelers in order that they might become completely familiar with it before their plane landed at Andrews Air Force Base in