Jihad Joe by J. M. Berger Read Free Book Online Page B

persistence can move from talk to action with active support from serious players met online. A 2010 report claiming that three hundred Americans had trained with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula raises alarm bells. 5 I’m a bit skeptical about this estimate, but if it’s true, that could be more Americans than took part in the wars in 1980s Afghanistan and 1990s Bosnia combined.
    Lack of training: The devastation wrought on al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan has paid dividends to U.S. national security. No one has ever come close to replicating the success of al Qaeda’s training network, in terms of length of training, quality of graduates, and relative ease of access. It’s not uncommon for modern-day American recruits to try several times before gaining access to any terrorist training camp, if they make it at all. Once they get there, their handlers are usually in a hurry to give them a bare minimum of instruction and send them off on an attack. As seen most memorably in the attempted Times Square bombing, inadequate training has a tendency to lead to failure.
    In light of these considerations, the danger posed by American jihadists cannot be measured on a linear scale over time. During the 1990s jihadists based in the United States were relatively professional: more experienced, better trained, and likely to have a military background. Their schemes—such as the World Trade Center bombing and the “Day of Terror” plot—were carefully planned, fairly well financed, and staffed by more people.
    In the years since September 11 and especially since 2008 and the rise of Anwar Awlaki, a new pattern has emerged. The attacks are more frequent and less complex. The attackers are more and more often radicalized young people, acting in small groups or alone, with minimal funds and even less training. Awlaki’s
Inspire
magazine has explicitly encouraged American Muslims to act alone using simple tactics, and al Qaeda Central has echoed that call in messages from Adam Gadahn and others. 6
    Counterterrorism officials worry about the prospect that U.S. terrorists will exploit their knowledge of American life and psychology to wreak terrible damage. It’s a valid concern, but Americans who join jihad movements often start by abandoning the trappings of their native culture, losing some of their competitive edge in the process.
    At-risk converts often adopt Arab dress and customs, even though such affectations have little to do with Islam per se. Those who join jihadist organizations are often so eager to assimilate that they affect or acquire vaguely Arabic-sounding accents, as in the cases of Omar Hammami and Adam Gadahn.
    From a Westerner’s perspective, this is a good thing. It makes them less effective at speaking to Americans in propaganda, and so far, it has also rendered them less effective at crafting uniquely American forms of attack. When someone is inducted into what is essentially a cult, he is likely to follow rather than lead.
    There are exceptions. People who grew up with a foot in both worlds—such as Anwar Awlaki and perhaps Adnan Shukrijumah—appear more successful at adapting their messages and tactics for Westerners. Awlaki has proved his ability to speak effectively to Westerners using their own idioms. Awlaki’s student Nidal Hasan struck out in a very American manner, with guns blazing. Another of Awlaki’s students, Samir Khan, produces the West-friendly
Inspire
magazine.
    Shukrijumah is more of a cipher. His ultimate impact on al Qaeda’s tactics is still shrouded in secrecy as of this writing, but if the volume of the FBI’s statements about him is any indication, there is cause for concern. Adam Gadahn made an impact on al Qaeda’s propaganda operations, but his more Westernized ideas, like the
Voice of the Caliphate
newscast, have faded away in favor of traditional talking-head communiqués.
    The potential game-changer that