Jihad Joe by J. M. Berger Read Free Book Online

of the stories they like to tell about themselves. Idealism burns brightly in the heart, and it is often impervious to reality.
    Violent tendencies or an obsession with violence: Military jihad and terrorism are inherently violent activities. Those who become jihadists must come to terms with that violence, and some fully embrace it. In certain cases, violent impulses are the primary driver that leads someone to jihad, even more than the defensive rationale. Tarek Mehanna watched and cheered videos of gory beheadings the way other Americans watch football. Isa Abdullah Ali, the veteran of Lebanon and Bosnia, is riveting when he describes himself as a professional soldier and killing machine. His adoption of jihad seems at times like an effort to ennoble a preexisting attraction to violence. Sometimes people seek out a convenient rationalization for their worst impulses, and sometimes that rationalization happens to be jihad.
    Ideology: As discussed in previous chapters, the role of ideology has changed significantly in the last thirty years. During the 1980s people were often recruited to jihad out of a sense of adventure or due to the personal charisma of leaders such as Abdullah Azzam, only becoming seriously indoctrinated with religious rationales after they arrived in Afghanistan or other fields of jihad. Today, the Internet offers a path to ideological radicalization before action. Recruits such as Tarek Mehanna and Zach Chesser absorbed the philosophy of politicized Islam and more advanced radical belief structures, like
takfir
, before ever taking action.
    Identity politics: On paper, Islam is color-blind. In practice, Muslims can be as racist as anyone else, and radical American movements like Al Fuqra— whose members are mostly black separatists—have a strong component of racial and identity politics. Islam itself can also be experienced as an exclusive political or social identity. Some American jihadists, such as Jose Padilla, have a history of gang identification prior to converting to Islam. The allure of joining a seemingly empowered social network should not be underestimated.
    Alienation: In Europe, social alienation is seen as a significant driver of radicalization among Muslims, but American Muslims tend to be more assimilated than their European counterparts. Nevertheless, some American Muslims— such as Daniel Maldonado—took steps toward radicalism because of a feeling that they could not practice Islam in the United States due to social pressures. Millions of American Muslims would disagree with Maldonado on this point, but it should be recognized as a potential risk factor.
    Fetishization of sex and women: The psychology of sex and gender is incredibly complicated, and I will not attempt a detailed deconstruction here. Yet it’s worth noting that sex often makes an appearance in these stories. Many American jihadists, such as Nidal Hasan and Omar Hammami, were described by friends as “desperate” to get married but only to extraordinarily chaste women. Some jihadist clerics even allow followers to have sex outside of marriage as part of their recruitment pitch. 2 Jihadists can also show clear signs of sexual dysfunction, such as Anwar Awlaki’s penchant for hanging around schoolyards and patronizing teenage prostitutes. The ubiquitous use of rape stories in jihadist propaganda also points toward a fetishized view of sex and women. It’s admirable to act to prevent rape and assist its victims, but the recurring tales of jihadists whose dreams are haunted by the screaming of Muslim women raise some questions worthy of deeper consideration.
    The mix of these qualities is fluid and has changed over time. For instance, the number of jihadist recruits who start from the broad platform of politicized Islam has increased, compared to those who react to specific situations of clearly defined aggression. The motivation of creating an Islamic state is more visible among