to reach the assailant and then disrupt aim. That's all they have to do. During the same attack, those responsible for protective actions have to reach the protectee, then move the protectee somewhere (away, down, out), or move themselves in front of the protectee. Any of these actions takes much more energy and time than, say, moving an attacker's arm one inch. When an attack is underway, the admirable (and almost never reached) goal of intentionally placing one's body between the protectee and an attacker will be relevant only if the protector is already very close to the protectee -- and even then, someone would still have to stop the attacker from continuing to do harm. All things considered, when we can choose where to be during an attack, being at an attacker will usually get better results than being at a protectee.
In the case of most rifle attacks, which usually occur from some distance and without warning (i.e., the gunshot is the first event that stimulates the Moment of Recognition), then protective responses are all you've got.
Of course, having protectors in both projective and protective roles affords the best situation of all, and few cases make this clearer than the assassination by sword of Inejiro Asanuma, Socialist Party Chairman in Japan (Compendium Case #69 ).
(c) NHK Television/Japan
In the photo you can see the attacker about to stab the Chairman with a sword. He has already stabbed him once, but this will be the mortal injury. Everyone is moving except the protectee. Four people are courageously intervening to grab the attacker -- and yet at this instant nobody is seeking to block or move the protectee. Had Chairman Asanuma been moved even slightly in any direction, the outcome might well have been different. And, had the attacker's aim been disrupted in any way, he'd likely have failed to kill the Chairman. We see that projective and protective actions are both important -- and combined, they are likely to be decisive.
Moving Is Usually Best
The Compendium cases show that even in situations less obvious than the Asanuma attack, protectees are almost always safer being moved from wherever they are when an attack starts to somewhere else. This might mean moving them a short distance (down, to the side, back) or a great distance (to the cars and away).
Among many reasons to move rather than stay put:
Attackers lose accuracy when required to track, so moving the protectee will reduce the chances of injury.
Protectors cannot know in the instant of attack what other hazards might be present or about to happen. The attack might not be over; it might have only just begun.
Even if the attack itself has ended, order is usually difficult to maintain after an incident (due to the emotion and reactions of people present). You can always bring the protectee back if things normalize quickly, but you cannot always easily leave if you've waited too long.
After an attack, even an unsuccessful one, protectors themselves need time to regroup, to assimilate what's happened, and to regain readiness for their job. An attack (or even a scare) takes much of the energy protectors have got.
An injury might not be immediately apparent, as in the case of President Reagan's shooting.
Out of public view, it will be easier to assess the impact of the incident (embarrassment from a pie in the face, wrestling with a paparazzi photographer, the attacker's gun turns out to be a starter's pistol, for example), and develop a PR posture in response to it.
Attackers understandably want as much time as possible to transpire between their Moment of Commitment and your Moment of Recognition. Since most attacks involve noise (gunshots, screams, grunts), it's difficult to attack without drawing any attention at all, but there have been some notable exceptions, cases in which nobody -- not even injured victims -- was immediately aware that an attack had occurred. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and his Vice-president Annette
Janwillem van de Wetering