Magnificent Delusions by Husain Haqqani Read Free Book Online Page B

cancer doesn’t spread there,” the US president reportedly said. “We also need to excise the cancer in Pakistan.” 14 The New York Times reported Obama’s view that “it did not matter how many troops were sent to Afghanistan if Pakistan remained a haven.” 15 Other reports cited Biden as describing Pakistan as the “greater danger” over Taliban control of the Afghan countryside. 16
    In 2010 Obama deployed several thousand more troops into Afghanistan in what was described as a “troop surge,” committing the United States to spending an additional $30 billion annually on enhancing itsmilitary presence there. The United States would thus make a serious effort to defeat the Taliban insurgency. Efforts for “a lasting partnership with Pakistan” would continue. Obama wanted to go down in history as a strong US president who did not hesitate to hunt terrorists in farther lands in pursuit of US national interests.
    After the surge was announced Holbrooke persisted with his diplomatic efforts to find an Afghan endgame. The Strategic Dialog also continued, as did the flow of US economic assistance and Coalition Support funds. Terrorist attacks inside Pakistan or involving Pakistanis abroad also remained a constant. The most significant of these was the attempt to set off a truck bomb in New York’s Times Square on May 1, 2010. Although the bomb did not go off, if it had, it could have killed a large number of people.
    For Americans this was a reminder of their vulnerability to attacks resembling 9/11. The FBI identified Faisal Shahzad, a thirty-year-old Pakistani-American as the man responsible for the plot. Shahzad told the FBI that he had trained in bomb making in Pakistan’s Waziristan region. 17 For Americans already wary of Pakistan, this was further proof that Pakistan’s failure to deal with terrorists was a direct threat to US security.
    During a meeting at the White House Jones told me that the Americans considered the Times Square attempted bombing as “a successful plot.” It was foiled by luck, not intelligence or law enforcement activity. “Neither American nor Pakistani intelligence could intercept it,” he remarked. US intelligence had reported that other similar plots were underway “involving several overlapping and interconnected groups.” Pakistan had been helpful in investigating Shahzad and his connections, but the United States wanted Pakistan to help preempt attacks, not just investigate them after the fact.
    Jones also visited Islamabad, where he conveyed a message from Obama to Zardari and Kayani. “The President wanted everyone in Pakistan to understand,” he declared, “that in case of a successful attack in the US, there are some things even he would not be able to stop.” Jones turned the Pakistani refrain about political compulsions on his hosts: “Just as there are political realities in Pakistan, there are political realities in the US,” he said.
    The national security adviser wanted Pakistanis to “understand clearly the message” that if a plot succeeds and its origins were traced to Pakistan, “no one will be able to stop the response and consequences.” In a matter-of-fact tone he also added that what he had said was not a threat—it was “just a statement of political fact.”
    Jones listed four specific actions the United States sought from Pakistan. First, the ISI needed to share “all intelligence with us and we will share intelligence with you.” Second, there should be immediate sharing of passenger data of flights originating from Pakistan. Third, counterterrorism cooperation should be enhanced. Fourth and finally, there should be an end to holding up visas for American intelligence and law enforcement personnel, “which is holding up our ability to protect against the terrorists.”
    The ISI claimed that it was already sharing all