NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century by Sunil Khilnani Read Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Sunil Khilnani
more widely in the region than we have done so far and to build our capacity for such wide-ranging engagement. We need to be in a position to anticipate and shape developments rather than merely reacting to them. Indeed, certain types of reactive responses—evacuation of expatriate Indians during crises, for instance—will become difficult in the climate of uncertainty that lies ahead.
In particular, we need to carefully distinguish between the emerging Islamist political forces and jihadi terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the past, there has been intense rivalry between them and alliances have usually been tactical and short-lived. We must be ready to work with Islamist groups that have entered the political mainstream in their countries and are competing by legitimate means to enter government. But we should also be clear that their hold on power will be contested by institutions that have existed long before the democratic turn in these countries. Some of these institutions will be important to us in securing and stepping up cooperationon security-related activities like counterterrorism and intelligence.
Related to this is our response to continuing political unrest in various countries of the region. In principle, we continue to support the sovereignty and integrity of these countries, and are averse to use of force by all sides. In practice, though, external intervention will remain a possibility. Our approach therefore has to be a proactive engagement with both the lawfully constituted authority and the democratic forces outside the government, with a view to creating the space for the emergence of a political settlement.
To preclude the possibility of intervention by external powers, we need to go beyond simply reiterating our support for sovereignty and non-intervention. We need to advance strategic arguments in the UN and other forums about the advisability and feasibility of intervention: Is the case for intervention clear-cut? Have all diplomatic options been exhausted? Are there military options that could be sensibly and prudently undertaken? Are the intervening powers prepared for the ensuing transition and the long-haul reconstruction usually required? We also need to be more forthright in contesting the normative justifications advanced by the intervening powers and their rather selective application.
The other key principle that should guide our strategic engagement with West Asia is the avoidance of sharp choices. In particular, we should try and steer clear of the escalating rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have major interests in our relationships with both these countries, and need to strike a careful balance in our dealings with each. The acquisition of overt nuclear weapons capability by Iran is undesirable. An additional nuclear weapons state in our strategic neighbourhood will make regional stability more precarious—not least because it may embolden other regional actors to take pre-emptive measures.
The preservation of our economic interests in West Asia will require considerable attention to building up our capabilities in the maritime domain (this is dealt with at greater length in Chapter Three ). But we also need to be prepared for a situation where persisting instability in the region results in a steep fall in energy supplies and a sharp rise in prices. We need to carefully monitor our strategic energy reserves and accelerate our efforts to diversify our sources of supply, and expand investment in alternative forms of energy.
East and South-East Asia
India’s enhanced engagement with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commenced with the announcement of India’s Look East Policy in 1992. From a sectoral dialogue partner, India is now a summit partner of ASEAN. At the India–ASEAN Commemorative Summit held in New Delhi in November 2012, the two sides decided to establish a strategic partnership that will encompass
In particular, we need to carefully distinguish between the emerging Islamist political forces and jihadi terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the past, there has been intense rivalry between them and alliances have usually been tactical and short-lived. We must be ready to work with Islamist groups that have entered the political mainstream in their countries and are competing by legitimate means to enter government. But we should also be clear that their hold on power will be contested by institutions that have existed long before the democratic turn in these countries. Some of these institutions will be important to us in securing and stepping up cooperationon security-related activities like counterterrorism and intelligence.
Related to this is our response to continuing political unrest in various countries of the region. In principle, we continue to support the sovereignty and integrity of these countries, and are averse to use of force by all sides. In practice, though, external intervention will remain a possibility. Our approach therefore has to be a proactive engagement with both the lawfully constituted authority and the democratic forces outside the government, with a view to creating the space for the emergence of a political settlement.
To preclude the possibility of intervention by external powers, we need to go beyond simply reiterating our support for sovereignty and non-intervention. We need to advance strategic arguments in the UN and other forums about the advisability and feasibility of intervention: Is the case for intervention clear-cut? Have all diplomatic options been exhausted? Are there military options that could be sensibly and prudently undertaken? Are the intervening powers prepared for the ensuing transition and the long-haul reconstruction usually required? We also need to be more forthright in contesting the normative justifications advanced by the intervening powers and their rather selective application.
The other key principle that should guide our strategic engagement with West Asia is the avoidance of sharp choices. In particular, we should try and steer clear of the escalating rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have major interests in our relationships with both these countries, and need to strike a careful balance in our dealings with each. The acquisition of overt nuclear weapons capability by Iran is undesirable. An additional nuclear weapons state in our strategic neighbourhood will make regional stability more precarious—not least because it may embolden other regional actors to take pre-emptive measures.
The preservation of our economic interests in West Asia will require considerable attention to building up our capabilities in the maritime domain (this is dealt with at greater length in Chapter Three ). But we also need to be prepared for a situation where persisting instability in the region results in a steep fall in energy supplies and a sharp rise in prices. We need to carefully monitor our strategic energy reserves and accelerate our efforts to diversify our sources of supply, and expand investment in alternative forms of energy.
East and South-East Asia
India’s enhanced engagement with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commenced with the announcement of India’s Look East Policy in 1992. From a sectoral dialogue partner, India is now a summit partner of ASEAN. At the India–ASEAN Commemorative Summit held in New Delhi in November 2012, the two sides decided to establish a strategic partnership that will encompass
Similar Books
Different Seasons
Stephen King
When the Fairytale Ends
Dwan Abrams
Christmas Moon
Sadie Hart
Killer Gourmet
G.A. McKevett
After River
Donna Milner
Kickoff for Love
Amelia Whitmore
Fatal Fairies (Renaissance Faire Mystery Book 8)
Joyce Lavene, Jim Lavene
Guarded Heart
Jennifer Blake
Moscardino
Enrico Pea
Darkover: First Contact
Marion Zimmer Bradley