access to our market. We should keep pushing for enhanced trade relationships. Although Pakistan seems open to granting most favoured nation (MFN) status to India we cannot take it as a foregone conclusion. India should be actively pushing for a far larger volume of overland trade through the Wagah and other border points, where we could install modern inspection equipment to prevent security lapses, and facilitate two-way trade while minimizing national security concerns. We should also examine whether our developing financial sector could service some of Pakistan’s business and investment requirements. India can also be a source of finance for Pakistan, thereby binding their economy into our own.
We should take the initiative on two pressing issues confronting the people of Pakistan: shortages of energy and water. We should look seriously at regional energy projects involving Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and CentralAsia. We should also propose discussion with Pakistan on integrated watershed management and best practices in the use and distribution of water.
The greater the exposure of ordinary Pakistanis to India, the less effective will be the official policy of deliberately cultivating a hostile attitude towards India. The promotion of exchanges at all levels among civil society, scholars, artists and students will provide a strong positive leverage for India. We can adopt unilateral measures to promote cross-border movement of people, even if there is no reciprocity. A more liberal visa regime, removing the restriction on the number of places to be visited, dispensing with the requirement of police reporting, issuing multiple-entry visas for known benign forces, especially those in the media, all these could be done unilaterally even if Pakistan does not respond. Importantly, these practices should not be interrupted in the event of rise in tensions.
The measures outlined above constitute a strategic toolbox with mid-range, positive and negative levers to influence the behaviour of Pakistan in the desired direction. The combinations in which these are wielded will depend on the evolving situation. But these capabilities and stances will provide the political leadership with a broader range of options than hitherto employed.
The current situation in Pakistan underlines the importance of preparing ourselves for certain contingencies. While a number of these could be envisioned, two situations need close attention. The first pertains to the possibility of nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan. This is discussed in the section on nuclear security in Chapter Five .
The second contingency that we need to prepare for is the possibility of spiralling instability in Pakistan (through political and civil conflict, or even a major environmental disaster), leading to a humanitarian crisis at our doorstep. Is it possible for us to seal our borders? If not, how do we expect to cope with a potentially large influx of Pakistanis? What lines of communication do we need to have in place to be able to work with those in Pakistan who might attempt to control this situation? These questions and more will need to be thought through well in advance. While we need to keep a close eye on the current unstable equilibrium in Pakistan we need also to develop operational contingency plans if the situation should unravel. We should not assume that all forms of instability are bad from our perspective. The challenge for our strategy is to cope with the consequences of its tipping over into outright instability.
The most important thing is that the relationshipwith Pakistan should be seen in all its complexities. We should keep in mind the long-term goal of restoring the strategic unity of the subcontinent in a way compatible with the well-being of all the peoples of South Asia. A simple-minded approach that focuses only on a limited set of instruments, or is held hostage to narrow political considerations, will whittle down our strategic
MR. PINK-WHISTLE INTERFERES