where a rogue “kill team” was subsequently prosecuted for extrajudicial killings. (Tunnel was investigated and absolved, but lower-level soldiers were eventually tried, and some were convicted.)
In November 2010, Major General James Terry arrived in Kandahar to lead Regional Command–South, the coalition headquarters, and attempt to turn the tide in his yearlong tour. His first order of business was to beat back the Taliban in an arc west of Kandahar City stretching from western Arghandab through Zhari and Panjwayi districts. Terry, who had fought here briefly with the Canadians in 2006, knew this was the epicenter of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne endured heavy casualties in Zhari, suffering ninety killed and wounded, many of them multiple amputees. The perimeter around their base was so heavily mined that they used rocket-launched explosive mine-clearing line charges called “miclics” to blast open paths for vehicles or foot patrols. {37}
Unlike some conventional commanders, Terry was a big fan of special operations forces. He counted on them to provide a rural security blanket through the Afghan Local Police, because he did not have enough troops to do it himself. He practiced counterinsurgency with a blend of enemy- and population-centric tactics: after using clearing operations to dislodge the Taliban, he quickly brought district governors back to their districts to begin the “hearts and minds” work by providing essential services.
Terry met frequently with the special operations battalion commander, Chris Riga, who was the current occupant of the special ops’ small patch of Kandahar Airfield. Special forces had claimed the cluster of blue and white buildings in 2001 and had been there ever since. Once part of the commercial airport, the long, low main building, with arched rooms and arcades, looked like a Hobbit motel. A few steps and a chain-link fence with a coded lock separated Riga’s Camp Brown from Terry’s headquarters, a building with a badly leaking roof surrounded by a stockade of two-story “man cans.”
Riga had made quite a name for himself. Two months before Terry’s arrival, at a provincial council meeting on September 14, the council chair and half-brother of the president, Ahmad Wali Karzai, announced that Afghan security forces would mount an all-out assault on western Arghandab. It would be led by a cocky and corrupt border policeman named Abdul Raziq. “Who will come with me?” Raziq asked. There was silence, and then Riga leaned forward. “I’ll come with you,” Riga said. Raziq got up from the table and started to leave. “When do we go?” Riga asked. “Are you ready? Let’s go tomorrow,” the itchy Afghan replied. {38}
Riga was primed for this scene. He had been called in by the British commander, Major General Nick Carter, a few days earlier. Carter explained to him that the Afghans were readying another offensive that was similar to the operation they had just launched in Malajat. Raziq had outpaced the conventional forces partnered with him in Malajat. This time, Carter said, the Afghans were prepared to go on their own, on orders of their president. “Can you partner with him?” Carter asked Riga. “Yes, we can partner with anyone,” Riga told him. He had been coming to southern Afghanistan since the beginning of the war; this was his sixth tour. Carter was a bit surprised when he saw Wali Karzai and many other Afghan officials and council members greet Riga with hugs and kisses at the council meeting. Riga had met Raziq on a previous tour in Zabul as a company commander, but he had not worked with him before. He knew that Raziq had been accused of a tribally motivated killing of thirteen Afghans in 2006 and was alleged to have made a lot of money from the bustling commerce at his base in the border town of Spin Boldak. {39}
Riga and Raziq left the council meeting and repaired to another room in the municipal