Quest for Honor by David Tindell Read Free Book Online

Mo’azzame Enghelab, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. Only a handful of people in the entire Islamic Republic knew the real truth about the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The president, Ahmadinejad, claimed to know everything, but the general knew this was not true. When he was elevated to command of the missile regiment two years ago, Fazeed was given what he felt was a full briefing on the status of his country’s military forces, and he had paid close attention ever since, especially to the progress of the nuclear program.
    He had been surprised to learn that the program was much more advanced than what he had heard. Enough disinformation was spread by the government’s counterintelligence services to preserve the fiction that was widely believed in the West, that they were several years away, and the president, to his credit, did his part, constantly repeating the mantra that Iran’s nuclear program was designed for peaceful purposes. Fazeed had long ago stopped being amazed at how the gullible Western media believed what lies they were told. Their politicians huffed and imposed sanctions, which the regime diligently worked around. The people grumbled, but for the most part did as they were told.
    Fazeed and his colleagues didn’t allow themselves to be fooled, though. The Western military and intelligence services, especially the Israelis and the Americans, certainly were not fooled. There was the constant threat that the Israelis, or perhaps both in concert, would attack in an attempt to delay the program. The general’s duty was to organize a missile regiment that would provide a deterrent force against such attack, preparing for the day when the conventional warheads then available could be replaced with nuclear payloads, giving Iran a much more powerful means to deter aggression…or to enhance its own.
    That day was close now, very close. It had always been only a matter of time, and of course the big question was whether the Israelis would give them that time. Fazeed doubted that they would. Were he a betting man, he would’ve given even money that an Israeli attack would happen within the next twelve to eighteen months. Such a scenario had been war-gamed several times, and the most favorable outcome his colleagues had come up with was discouraging: they could at best count on shooting down perhaps half of the attacking Israeli planes. Enough would get through to cause serious damage to his country’s nuclear facilities, delaying the program at least five years. If the Zionists attacked with their Jericho missiles, Iran’s only option would be to launch a retaliatory strike—if there was anything left to retaliate with.
    There was a way around that problem. Everybody knew the Israelis would never attack without American support. But if such support were withdrawn, that would be a different matter altogether. Various projects were underway to achieve that end, but the general had always doubted whether any of them would be successful. Using disinformation and subterfuge to turn American politicians and public opinion away from Israel was one way. It had been done before, not too long ago, but Fazeed knew this time was different. Israel was not South Vietnam, and frankly he doubted whether the mullahs framing this policy were as clever as the North Vietnamese and their Soviet KGB advisers had been, although it did appear they’d achieved some success in making the Western media sympathetic to Islam and thus hostile to Israel. Despite that, he was certain that his country’s intelligence services would never be able to recruit the sorts of helpful stooges on American college campuses and in the ranks of Hollywood elite who had been so instrumental in propelling the North Vietnamese to victory.
    Then he was told about one project that most definitely held great promise, not to mention great danger. For six months now, he had devoted increasing amounts of his time toward that end. He tried not to