Scapegoat: The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Dr Martin Stephen Read Free Book Online Page B

such vessels to be rushed there in the event of war – the so-called idea of a ‘main fleet to Singapore’ – in the meantime trusting to its land defences and air cover. The time for which Singapore would have to defend itself alone varied, with ninety days the most likely option. This was the theory. In practice there never was going to be the money available in 1930s Britain to make Singapore anything like the impregnable fortress Britain wished its own and other people to think it was, nor was the Royal Navy ever likely to have enough ships at its disposal to send a significant fleet so far away from the home theatre of operations, where the very survival of England as an independent nation would be at stake. The ‘main fleet’ idea was little more than spin to calm down Australia in particular or to attract the United States to using Singapore as a main base. It was thought, not without reason, that it would help deter Japanese aggression if Britain knowingly talked up the ‘impregnable fortress’ concept of Singapore. Such puffing of reality cost nothing. Unfortunately, it was a bluff that the loss of confidential papers sent for Singapore on the steamship Automedon blew apart, and a bluff that as a result the Japanese felt able to call.
    Ironically, the great British naval base at Singapore commenced in 1921 but not finally completed until 1938, exacerbated tensions. Seen as defensive by the British, it was violently objected to as an offensive weapon by the Japanese and seen as a sword pointed at the Japanese heart. If so, it was a remarkably blunt one. Threat evaluations had suggested the risk to Singapore came from sea-based bombardment and assault, and that its back door of thick Malay jungle was impassable to any significant number of land forces. It is a common misconception that most of its heavy guns pointed only out to sea. This was not true. What was true, and crucial in Singapore’s inability to defend itself, is that the available ammunition for these guns were armour-piercing shells designed for use against ships but hopeless for use against ground troops, where high-explosive shells were essential. Armour-piercing rounds simply buried themselves in the ground which then contained much of the explosion. In 1937 Major-General Dobbie, in overall command in Malaya, realized how vulnerable Singapore was, but it was too late, and only paltry sums were spent on reinforcing the northern perimeter, or the east where landings might take place. Similarly, the Singapore Defence Conference held in 1940 recognized that with Japanese expansion into Indo-China the main threat to Singapore was possibly to come from the north and ground troops, and asked for 582 modern aircraft to act as Singapore’s main defence until the Royal Navy arrived. The majority of these were never sent. Something that did happen was a new command structure – after all, it was a cheap option and might make those involved feel that at least something was being done. The importance being placed on air cover as Singapore’s main defence until naval reinforcement could arrive is illustrated by the appointment of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham as overall Commander in Chief of Far East Forces. He was due for routine replacement when hostilities broke out. His appointment should not be seen as a belated realization on the part of the powers that be that air power was now the dominant force. Rather, it was the only option left after it had been accepted that the dominant force, sea power, would be late in coming.
    We now know that Singapore was a disaster waiting to happen. One area was a lack of clarity over what would actually be defended in the event of hostilities – the Malayan Peninsula or parts of it, or just Singapore itself. Operation Matador was a plan for a pre-emptive invasion of southern Thailand, produced by the military in part because they knew the real weaknesses of Singapore’s defences. In the event it was