Supreme Commander by Stephen E. Ambrose Read Free Book Online

commander brought to the operation qualities lacking in himself, in Bradley, and in SHAEF generally. But he also insisted on limiting the scope of Patton’s influence and made sure Bradley kept a tight check on Patton. The difficulties in the Eisenhower-Montgomery relationship, in contrast to the Eisenhower-Patton relationship, were that Eisenhower did not have a Bradley to control Montgomery, and he did not count Montgomery as a personal friend, as he did Patton.
    Given the difference in personality, national background, and position, it was inevitable that Eisenhower and Montgomery would disagree, and that they would find it difficult to agree on what they were disagreeing about. Eisenhower’s vagueness contributed to this result, as did Montgomery’s tendency to seize on a phrase Eisenhower had used and regard it as settled policy. When it turned out that Eisenhower had not meant it the way Montgomery thought, Montgomery grew furious. He accused Eisenhower of changing his mind and agreed with Brooke that the Supreme Commander was always shifting, “inclining first one way, then the other,” according to the views of the last man with whom he had talked. Brooke thought Eisenhower was a man without backbone who acted as “an arbiter balancing the requirements of competing allies and subordinates rather than a master of the field making a decisive choice.…” 2
    But although it was true that in September and October Eisenhower never took a tight grip on the battle or gave clear, forceful orders, he had not allowed Bradley to change his mind. Eisenhower never came close to putting all his chips in Montgomery’s hands and allowing the Twenty-first Army Group commander to gamble everything on the one shot. But he did give Montgomery priority in supply, since the objectives in the north were more important than those in front of Bradley, and he did give Montgomery verbal support whenever possible in an effort to keep the British general happy. Eisenhower’s habit of seizing upon any agreement he had with Montgomery and emphasizing it while trying to ignore the more frequent and more serious disagreements may have led Montgomery and Brooke astray in their analysis of Eisenhower’s thinking.
    On the question of a broad front, Eisenhower had always made it clear that he intended to adhere to the original pre-OVERLORD plan and advance on both sides of the Ardennes. As he pointed out in an office memorandum of September 5, the broad-front approach “takes advantage of all existing lines of communication in the advance towards Germany and brings the southern force [Bradley’s] on to the Rhine at Coblentz, practically on the flank” of Montgomery’s forces. He said he could see no reason to change this conception, for “the defeat of the German armies is complete, and the only thing now needed to realize the whole conception is speed.”
    But if Eisenhower did not waver, a more important question remains. Was his insistence on a broad front wise? Was he right or was Montgomery? Since the AEF did not deliver the final blow in the fall of 1944, it is clear that Eisenhower’s way did not work. The situation that Eisenhower had been afraid of but had been willing to ignore came about—his armies got overextended and became immobilized because of a lack of supplies. There was no point in reaching the German border unless the armies could exploit that position when they got there, Eisenhower had told Marshall, but that is exactly what happened. When the AEF reached the West Wall it was immobilized. But to say that Eisenhower’s policy was unsuccessful does not say that Montgomery’s would have succeeded. Since the single thrust strategy was not tried, it is impossible to judge.
    Eisenhower’s reasons for rejecting the single thrust were manifold. On military grounds, he doubted that Montgomery could deliver it, since SHAEF still had only the inadequate Channel ports available and they were insufficient to supply a thrust