The Burglary by Betty Medsger Read Free Book Online

powerful person at the pinnacle of American law enforcement. He thought that if Hoover was a consummate bureaucrat, perhaps he kept and distributed within the bureau detailed records of his opinions and his operations. And, he thought, perhaps he also required those who carried out his orders to file detailed reports.
    It was just a hunch.
    As Davidon framed the problem to himself, he concluded that the question could be answered only by presenting hard evidence to the public. Neither rhetorical condemnation nor unproved assumptions would do. Rhetoric without supporting evidence of actual suppression of dissent could be dismissed easily and likely would lead to deeper cynicism than already existed. A great believer in the potential of average people to make wise decisions if they are armed with information, he was confident that if evidence of official suppression of dissent could be found and be presented to the public, people would demand that such suppression be stopped.
    But how could evidence be found? In a life spent as a problem solver, in physics and in activism, this was the most difficult problem Davidon had ever faced. He could not shake the thought that evidence might exist, and if it existed, it should be possible to find it and prove conclusively whetherthe destructive rumors were true. But he could think of no lawful way to find evidence.
    This perplexing dilemma led Davidon, in late 1970, to think again of burglary. He disliked the idea of using burglary as a resistance tool, just as he had when he reluctantly joined Catholic activists in raiding draft board offices in early 1970. But when he considered the options, there seemed to be no other way to get documentary evidence of FBI operations except by breaking into an FBI office and taking files.
    Just as Davidon was ready to ask a few people he deeply trusted what they thought of his idea, two events in late 1970 focused national attention on Hoover and the FBI.
    The first event took place November 27, 1970, the day after Thanksgiving, when the director made a rare appearance before theSupplemental and Deficiencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. He went to Capitol Hill that day to make the case he made to Congress every year, usually before a House Committe: that a crisis atmosphere made it essential that Congress increase the bureau’s budget. But today he had an additional reason for testifying: to disclose highly charged secrets his top aides had urged him not to reveal.
    Hoover had little to worry about regarding budget increases. He had long had extraordinary success in getting the increases he wanted. As
Los Angeles Times
reportersJack Nelson andRonald J. Ostrow wrote in their 1972 book
The FBI and the Berrigans
, “Only twice since 1950 had the FBI not received the exact amount of its budget requests. On those two occasions, the FBI received
more
than he requested.” With few exceptions in his nearly half century as director, his sessions before Congress were lovefests, not inquiries. Members of Congress would rise, one by one, to praise and thank him. They treated him as though they were there to serve him, not to question him. Years later, the public would learn that Hoover carefully cultivated this sense of intimidation, but at the time only the intimidated had a clue.
    By then Hoover had been director of the bureau for forty-six years, sinceCalvin Coolidge was president. That made him the longest-serving appointed public official in U.S. history, a record that still stands. Though the attorney general was technically his supervisor—at this time it wasJohn Mitchell, the future head of President Nixon’s reelection campaign, who would later go to prison for his crimes in theWatergate scandal—Hoover acted as though he was his own boss. With very few exceptions, most attorneys general and presidents treated Hoover as though his perception of his power was correct.
    Like most senators and members of