The Secret Sentry by Matthew M. Aid Read Free Book Online Page B

the overstretched AFSA could afford at the time. 15
    Beginning in July 1950, and continuing through the fall, Zaslow’s team picked up indications in these low-level intercepts
that the Chinese were shifting hundreds of thousands of combat troops from southern and central China to Manchuria by rail. 16 But according to Cynthia Grabo, then an intelligence analyst at the Pentagon, the U.S. Army’s intelligence analysts refused
to accept the reports of a Chinese military buildup in Manchuria, arguing instead that the Chinese intended to invade Taiwan. 17
    But there were other SIGINT sources that were indicating that China intended to take forceful action in Korea. AFSA’s principal
source for intelligence on China was its ability to read the cable traffic of arguably the best informed foreign diplomat
based in Beijing, Dr. Kavalam Madhava Panikkar (sometimes spelled Pannikar), India’s ambassador to China. Panikkar had the
ear of Premier Chou Enlai and other senior Chinese leaders, which made him AFSA’s best source for high-level diplomatic intelligence
about what was going on in Beijing. 18 For example, intercepts of Panikkar’s cables to New Delhi in July and August 1950 revealed that he had been told by Chou Enlai
that the Chinese would not intervene militarily in Korea. 19
    But diplomatic decrypts revealed that the position of the Chinese leadership changed dramatically following the amphibious
landing at Inchon. The decrypted cables of the Burmese ambassador in Beijing, whose government also maintained generally friendly
relations with China, warned that China now intended to become involved militarily in Korea. 20 A week later, decrypts of Ambassador Panikkar’s cable traffic to New Delhi revealed that on September 25, Chou En-lai had
warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene militarily in Korea if U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel. 21 But Panikkar’s reporting was either discounted or ignored completely by policymakers in Washington because of his alleged
pro-Chinese leanings. 22
    But the Chinese were not bluffing. On October 1, South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and marched into North Korea.
The next day, the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo decided to intervene militarily in the Korean War, with Mao Tse-tung
ordering 260,000 Chinese troops to begin crossing the Yalu River on October 15. 23
    The Chinese leadership in Beijing made one last final effort to head off war with the U.S. Shortly after midnight on the morning
of October 3, 1950, Chou En-lai called in Ambassador Panikkar and told him that if U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel,
China would send its forces across the Yalu River to defend North Korea. On the same day, the Dutch chargé d’affaires in Beijing
cabled his foreign ministry in the Hague quoting Chou En-lai to the effect that China would fight if U.N. forces crossed the
38th parallel. 24 But Washington refused to pay heed to these warnings, which were dismissed in their entirety as being nothing more than a
bluff. On October 5, the first American combat troops were ordered to cross the 38th parallel and advance on the North Korean
capital of Pyongyang. By this singular act, General MacArthur committed U.S. and U.N. forces to a course of action that was
to have dire consequences for everyone involved. 25
    On the morning of October 15, Mao sent a cable to his military commander in Manchuria, General Peng Dehuai, ordering him to
send the first Chinese army units across the Yalu River into North Korea. On the night of October 15–16, the 372nd Regiment
of the Chinese 42nd Army secretly crossed the Yalu. The die had been cast. China had entered the Korean War. 26
    Declassified documents confirm that AFSA failed to detect the movement of the more than three hundred thousand Chinese soldiers
into Korea, largely because the Chinese forces operated in complete radio silence. 27 But SIGINT did pick up a number of changes in Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean military