The Victors: Eisenhower and His Boys : The Men of World War II by Stephen Ambrose Read Free Book Online Page A

attack. By the sixteenth he was at the Kasserine Pass and had inflicted major losses on the green American troops. Fredendall all but collapsed. It appeared that Rommel was about to drive the Allies out of Tunisia.  Despite the embarrassing and costly losses, Eisenhower was not disheartened. He realized that all his lectures on the need to eliminate complacency and instill battlefield discipline among the American troops had had little effect, but he also realized that the shock of encountering the Wehrmacht on the offensive was accomplishing his objectives for him.
    “Our soldiers are learning rapidly,” he told Marshall at the height of the battle, “and while I still believe that many of the lessons we are forced to learn at the cost of lives could be learned at home, I assure you that the troops that come out of this campaign are going to be battle wise and tactically efficient.” The best news of all was that American soldiers, who had previously shown a marked disinclination to advance under enemy fire, were recovering rapidly from the initial shock of Rommel’s attack. The troops did not like being kicked around and were beginning to dig in and fight.  Nevertheless, on February 21, Rommel got through Kasserine Pass. Eisenhower regarded this development as less a threat, more an opportunity, because by then his efforts had produced a preponderance of American firepower at the point of attack, especially in artillery. Rommel had a long, single supply line that ran through a narrow pass, which made him vulnerable.  “We have enough to stop him,” Eisenhower assured Marshall, but he expected to do more than that. He urged Fredendall to launch an immediate counterattack on Rommel’s flanks, seize the pass, cut off the Afrika Korps, and destroy it. But Fredendall disagreed with Eisenhower’s conclusion that Rommel had gone as far as he could; he expected him to make one more attack and insisted on staying on the defensive to meet it. Rommel, accepting the inevitable, began his retreat that night. It was successful, and a fleeting opportunity was lost.  In a tactical sense Rommel had won the victory. At small cost to himself, he had inflicted more than five thousand American casualties, destroyed hundreds of tanks and other equipment. But he had made no strategic gain, and in fact had done Eisenhower a favor. In his pronouncements before Kasserine, Eisenhower had consistently harped on what a tough business war is and on the overwhelming need to impress that fact on the troops.
    But the man most responsible for American shortcomings was Eisenhower himself, precisely because he was not tough enough. Despite his serious and well-founded doubts he had allowed Fredendall to retain command. Eisenhower had allowed a confused command situation to continue. He had accepted intelligence reports based on insufficient sources. And at the crucial moment, when Rommel was at his most vulnerable, he had failed to galvanize his commanders, which allowed Rommel to get away.
    Kasserine was Eisenhower’s first real battle; taking it all in all, his performance was miserable. Only American firepower, and German shortages, had saved him from a humiliating defeat.
    But Eisenhower and the American troops profited from the experience. The men, he reported to Marshall, “are now mad and ready to fight.” So was he. “All our people,” he added, “from the very highest to the very lowest have learned that this is not a child’s game and are ready and eager to get down to . . .  business.” He promised Marshall that thereafter no unit under his command “will ever stop training,” including units in the front line. And he fired Fredendall, replacing him with Patton.
    When Patton arrived Eisenhower gave him advice that might better have been self-directed. “You must not retain for one instant,” Eisenhower warned Patton, “any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do the job. . . . This